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ABSTRACT 
To be able to interact with our surroundings in a goal directed manner, we need to have sense 
what our body is made up of as well as a sense of being able to control our body. These two 
experiences, the sense of body ownership and the sense of agency, respectively, are 
fundamental to our self-perception but have historically not received any notable attention from 
the scientific community. This lack of interest probably stems from the fact that these 
experiences are phenomenologically thin in our everyday lives and that we cannot voluntarily 
turn them off, they are constantly there. However, for patients suffering from disturbances in 
the processes underlying these experiences, their importance becomes exceedingly clear. 
Lesions in the frontal, temporal or parietal lobe can lead to patients losing the sense of 
ownership of their limb (asomatognosia), and sometimes even attributing the limb to someone 
else (somatoparaphrenia). Similarly, patients suffering from lesions in the frontal lobe, parietal 
lobe or corpus callosum can experience a lack of control over their own hand (anarchic hand 
syndrome), while patients suffering from schizophrenia display difficulties in distinguishing 
self-generated from externally generated actions, implicating disturbances in the processes 
underlying the sense of agency. 
With the discovery of body illusions, combined with functional neuroimaging, it became 
possible to study the perceptual and neural mechanisms of the sense of body ownership in 
healthy volunteers. Studies using these illusions have elucidated the perceptual rules of body 
ownership as well as its neural correlates and has given rise to a number of different 
philosophical, neurocognitive and computational models of the sense of body ownership. 
Meanwhile, the sense of agency has mostly been studied disconnected from the sense of body 
ownership, focusing on agency over self-generated external sensory effects such as auditory 
tones. This thesis sought to bring these two experiences together and advance our knowledge 
of the perceptual and neural mechanisms underlying the sense of body ownership and the sense 
of agency as well how these two experiences interact. Studies I & II investigate certain aspects 
of the sense of body ownership, and in particular its relation to the visuo-proprioceptive 
recalibration of limb position often seen in bodily illusions. Study III investigated how this 
visuo-proprioceptive recalibration is related to voluntary, but unconscious movements. Study 
IV investigated the neural correlates of the sense of body ownership and agency as well as their 
interaction.  
In Study I, we present empirical evidence in favor of models where the subjective sense of 
limb ownership is not reliant on a visuo-proprioceptive recalibration of perceived limb position. 
In Study II, we show that the subjective sense of limb ownership and the visuo-proprioceptive 
recalibration of limb position have similar temporal decay curves, suggestive of a causal 
relationship between them. In Study III, we show that the increase in the recalibration of limb 
position seen in active movements is not dependent on conscious intention, action awareness 
or salient error signals, indicative of an unconscious efference copy-based mechanism. Finally, 
in Study IV, we identify brain regions in the frontal and parietal lobe which are associated with 
the sense of body ownership, while brain regions in the frontal and temporal lobe are associated 
with the sense of agency. We show that the sense of agency in the presence of a sense of body 
ownership (i.e., agency of bodily actions) is associated with increased activity in the primary 
sensory cortex, whereas the sense of agency in the absence of ownership (i.e., agency of 
external events) is associated with increased activity in the visual association cortex. Together, 
these findings shed light on the perceptual and neural mechanisms underlying the sense of body 
ownership and agency as well as their interaction.  
  
LIST OF SCIENTIFIC PAPERS 
 
LIST OF ADDITIONAL PUBLICATIONS 
Guterstam, Abdulkarim, Ehrsson (2015). Illusory ownership of an invisible body reduces 
autonomic and subjective social anxiety responses. Scientific Reports. 
Gentile, Björnsdotter, Petkova, Abdulkarim, Ehrsson (2015). Patterns of neural activity in 
the ventral premotor cortex reflect a whole-body multisensory percept. Neuroimage. 
 
I. Abdulkarim & Ehrsson (2016). No causal link between changes in hand position 
sense and feeling of limb ownership in the rubber hand illusion. Attention, 
Perception & Psychophysics. 
 
II. Abdulkarim & Ehrsson (2018). Recalibration of hand position sense during 
unconscious active and passive movements. Experimental Brain Research. 
 
III. Abdulkarim, Hayatou, Ehrsson (2020). Sustained rubber hand illusion after end of 
visuo-tactile stimulation with similar time courses for reduction of subjective 
ownership and proprioceptive drift. Manuscript. 
 
IV. Abdulkarim, Guterstam, Hayatou, Ehrsson (2020). The neural substrates of body 
ownership and agency and their interaction during voluntary movement. 
Manuscript. 
 
  
 
  
CONTENTS 
1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 The physical body .................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 The sense of body ownership .................................................................................................. 1 
1.2.1 Bodily illusions .......................................................................................................... 1 
1.2.2 What is the sense of body ownership? ...................................................................... 4 
1.2.3 Multisensory mechanisms ......................................................................................... 8 
1.2.4 Neural correlates of body ownership ...................................................................... 10 
1.2.5 Disorders of body ownership .................................................................................. 12 
1.3 The sense of agency ............................................................................................................... 14 
1.3.1 What is the sense of agency? ................................................................................... 14 
1.3.2 The comparator and beyond .................................................................................... 16 
1.3.3 Action awareness, intentions and causality ............................................................ 19 
1.3.4 Disorders of agency ................................................................................................. 21 
1.3.5 Neural correlates of agency ..................................................................................... 23 
1.4 The Sense of body ownership and the sense agency – additive or independent? ................ 24 
2 Aims .................................................................................................................................................. 27 
2.1 STUDY I ................................................................................................................................ 27 
2.2 STUDY II .............................................................................................................................. 27 
2.3 STUDY III ............................................................................................................................. 27 
2.4 STUDY IV ............................................................................................................................. 27 
3 Methods ............................................................................................................................................. 29 
3.1 Participants ............................................................................................................................ 29 
3.2 Questionnaires ....................................................................................................................... 29 
3.3 Proprioceptive drift ................................................................................................................ 30 
3.4 Hand displacement apparatus ................................................................................................ 31 
3.5 Hand illusion box .................................................................................................................. 31 
3.6 Moving rubber hand illusion setup ....................................................................................... 32 
3.7 Functional magnetic resonance imaging ............................................................................... 33 
3.7.1 General ..................................................................................................................... 33 
3.7.2 Limitations ............................................................................................................... 34 
3.7.3 Preprocessing ........................................................................................................... 36 
3.7.4 Univariate analyses .................................................................................................. 37 
3.7.5 The problem of multiple comparisons in fMRI ...................................................... 37 
4 Main results and conclusions ............................................................................................................ 39 
4.1 STUDY I ................................................................................................................................ 40 
4.2 STUDY II .............................................................................................................................. 42 
4.3 STUDY III ............................................................................................................................. 44 
4.4 STUDY IV ............................................................................................................................. 46 
5 Discussion ......................................................................................................................................... 51 
5.1 The sense of body ownership – inferring and integrating .................................................... 51 
5.2 The sense of agency – predicting and comparing ................................................................. 54 
5.3 Ownership and Agency – protecting and guiding ................................................................ 57 
5.4 Relevance for clinical populations ........................................................................................ 59 
6 Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... 61 
7 References ......................................................................................................................................... 62 
 
  
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
RF 
fMRI 
EEG 
ECoG 
EMG 
TMS 
receptive field 
functional magnetic resonance imaging 
electroencephalography 
electrocorticography 
electromyography 
transcranial magnetic stimulation 
BOLD blood oxygen level dependent 
FWHM full-width-at-half-maximum 
GLM 
ROI 
SMA 
pre-SMA 
PMv/PMd 
IPS 
PPC 
SMG 
STG 
DLPFC 
 
general linear model 
region of interest 
supplementary motor area 
pre-supplementary motor area 
ventral (v) and dorsal (d) premotor cortex 
intraparietal sulcus 
posterior parietal cortex 
supramarginal gyrus 
superior temporal gyrus 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
 

  1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE PHYSICAL BODY  
There are primarily two ways in which we as humans interact with the outside world (outside 
the boundaries of the physical body). Through the microscopic transport of ions, atoms and 
molecules across cell membranes, we absorb nutrients, exchange gases, excrete waste etc., 
whereas through macroscopic movements, for which the executant is skeletal muscle, we 
relocate our body and our limbs in space. The former is outside the realm of volition, we cannot 
control the movement of elementary particles by will, whereas the latter is intimately linked to 
volition. To move our body and relocate our limbs in space in a goal directed manner, we need 
to have a sense of what belongs to our body and not, since it would be fruitless to attempt to 
move bodies or limbs that do not belong to us by sheer will. This sense of owning one’s body 
has, despite the fact that our physical body is the vessel through which we both observe and 
interact with our surroundings, received little attention from the scientific community. The lack 
of interest in this so-called body ownership probably stems from difficulties related to the fact 
that the feeling of owning one’s body cannot be voluntarily turned off, it is constantly there and 
we experience, as the psychologist William James so elegantly expressed it, “the same old 
body, always there” (James, 1890). The physical body is indeed a peculiar object in the world, 
aside from the fact that it likely is the most familiar object to us, we experience it from the 
“inside”, where sensory information from our exteroceptive, as well as interoceptive senses are 
all experienced from inside our bodies. With that said, the experience of one’s own body 
contains more than the sense of ownership, it also includes for instance the sense of agency 
(controlling the body) and the sense of self-location (locating the body in space). This thesis 
aims at elucidating the perceptual and neural mechanisms of two of these basic aspects: the 
sense of body ownership and the sense of agency.  
1.2 THE SENSE OF BODY OWNERSHIP 
1.2.1 Bodily illusions 
The study of the sense of body ownership was until recently confined to case studies of patients 
with disturbances in the perception of their own bodies. These studies were limited by both the 
small number of patients displaying such disturbances, but also by the fact that the underlying 
pathologies displayed a staggering diversity, ranging from brain lesions to amputations. 
However, with the development of body illusions, it became possible to study the sense of body 
ownership in a controlled laboratory setting in healthy volunteers. In 1998, psychologists 
Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen published the seminal paper on the so-called rubber 
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hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). By stroking a humanoid rubber hand placed in view 
of the participants and the participants’ real hand (which was hidden from sight), synchronously 
and at corresponding places, the participants would start to feel the touches of the brush on the 
rubber hand and further that the rubber hand was their hand. Since its publication, the range of 
body illusions have extended to include whole bodies (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008), invisible 
body parts (Guterstam et al., 2013) and invisible bodies (Guterstam et al., 2015). Moreover, the 
perceptual rules guiding these bodily illusions have been elucidated, these include: the spatial 
rule(s) (i), the temporal rule (ii), the anatomical rule (iii) and the tactile congruence rule (iv), 
which I will exemplify below in the case of the rubber hand illusion. The spatial rule(s) (i) 
postulate that in order to perceive the rubber hand as one’s own, the visuo-tactile stimuli need 
to be spatially congruent (e.g., by stroking the participant’s hand and the rubber hand at 
corresponding places) (Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Gentile et al., 2013; Guterstam et al., 
2013), the viewed hand needs to be within a certain distance of the felt hand (approximately 
27,5 cm, (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014b; Lloyd, 2007)) and the touches need to be applied in the 
same direction with regards to a hand-centered spatial reference frame (Costantini & Haggard, 
2007). The temporal rule (ii) postulates that the visuo-tactile stimuli have to be temporally 
synchronous, with the illusory experience declining significantly as delays between the seen 
and felt touches approach 300 ms (Shimada et al., 2009), and in fact, a frequently used control 
condition introduces a temporal delay between the seen and felt touches in the range of 500-
1000 ms, which has reliably been shown to abolish the illusory sense of body ownership 
(Abdulkarim & Ehrsson, 2016; Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; H Henrik Ehrsson et al., 2004; 
Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014a; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). The anatomical rule states that the 
viewed body parts have to be humanoid in shape, where a block of wood does not induce the 
illusion (Guterstam et al., 2013; Tsakiris et al., 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) and is 
frequently used as a control condition. One study investigated how much structural similarity 
to a humanoid hand the object being stroked has to have in order to induce a sense of ownership. 
The results indicated that the object had to resemble a hand in both shape and structure to 
induce a sense of body ownership (Tsakiris et al., 2010). On the other hand, the material of the 
hand seems to matter less, since the rubber hand has been induced with wooden hands (Kalckert 
& Ehrsson, 2012), metallic hands (Rosén et al., 2009), 3D digital images of hands presented in 
head-mounted displays (Gentile et al., 2013) and hands with a skin color that differs from that 
of the participant (Farmer et al., 2012). Finally, the tactile congruence rule (iv) is based on 
recent studies that have shown that incongruencies between the properties of the tactile stimuli 
used on the rubber hand and the participants real hand lead to significant reductions of the 
illusion strength. A reduction was observed for object incongruency (for instance pencil vs 
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paintbrush) (Ward et al., 2015), whereas no differences were seen for surface incongruency 
(for instance piece of cotton vs sponge) (Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2009), perhaps reflecting the 
mismatch tolerance of this rule.  
Following the classical rubber hand illusion, several body illusions have been published, 
including “the invisible hand illusion” where the rubber hand is removed from the setup, and 
instead the contours of an invisible hand is delineated in empty space leading to an embodiment 
of that portion of empty space (Guterstam et al., 2013). Similarly, the invisible body illusion 
made use of head-mounted displays to induce the illusion of owning an entire invisible body 
by delineating the contours of an invisible body in empty space (Guterstam et al., 2015). Most 
interestingly, however, the moving rubber hand illusion moved away from purely visuo-tactile 
stimulation to induce illusory ownership of the rubber hand (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014a). 
In the moving rubber hand illusion, a wooden or rubber hand with flexible joints is placed on 
a small table, under which the participant’s real hand is hidden. The index finger of the rubber 
hand and the participant’s hand are connected with a rod that passes through a small hole in the 
table, linking the movements of the participant’s hand and the rubber hand. When the 
participants move their index finger, the index finger of the rubber hand will move in synchrony 
and with the same amplitude. After a few such tapping movements with the index finger, the 
participants will start to experience that the rubber hand is their hand, and further that they can 
control it. What is particularly interesting about the moving rubber hand illusion is that it 
induces an illusory sense of body ownership as well as a sense of agency over the rubber hand, 
and even more intriguingly, if the fingers are moved passively, the sense of body ownership is 
retained whereas the sense of agency is diminished. Conversely, if the rubber hand is placed in 
an anatomically incongruent position (rotated 180 degrees) and the participants actively move 
their index finger and thus the index finger of the rubber hand, they will experience a sense of 
agency over the rubber hand, while no sense of body ownership of the rubber hand will be 
elicited (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012).  
  
 4 
 
There are different ways to measure the sense of body ownership in these bodily illusions. 
Explicit judgements of the sense of body ownership through questionnaires are widely used to 
evaluate the existence of body ownership or not (Abdulkarim & Ehrsson, 2016; Botvinick & 
Cohen, 1998; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014a; Longo et al., 2008). However, such explicit 
judgements can be influenced by cognitive biases, task compliance and suggestibility, and to 
this end, implicit tasks and measures have also been developed. The so-called skin conductance 
response measures the changes in galvanic skin conductance in response to threatening stimuli 
directed at the illusory limb or body (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Guterstam et al., 2013, 
2015; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008). The increase in skin conductance in response to such stimuli 
in conditions with ownership of the illusory body or body part compared to control conditions 
in which no ownership is present has been interpreted to be due to increased sweating related 
to an autonomic stress response (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; H Henrik Ehrsson, 2007; 
Guterstam et al., 2011). Another implicit measure is the so-called proprioceptive drift, which 
is the change in perceived limb location before and after the induction of the rubber hand 
illusion. The proprioceptive drift is measured by removing visual cues of the position of the 
rubber hand and the participant’s real hand, either by occluding them from sight or by having 
the participants close their eyes and subsequently ask the participants to indicate the perceived 
location of their limb. In the illusory conditions, the participants will display a larger drift in 
perceived limb location towards the rubber hand compared to the control conditions. The 
proprioceptive drift has been widely used as a measure of the illusion, probably due to the fact 
that it is easy to administer, does not require much in terms of technical equipment, and has 
been shown to correlate with the illusory experience (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Costantini & 
Haggard, 2007; H. Henrik Ehrsson et al., 2005; Guterstam et al., 2013; Longo et al., 2008; 
Samad et al., 2015; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). However, recent findings have suggested that 
the proprioceptive drift and the subjective experience of body ownership are dissociable 
(Abdulkarim & Ehrsson, 2016; Rohde et al., 2011), and therefore in Study II, we wanted to 
investigate the temporal dynamics of the proprioceptive drift and the subjective illusion ratings, 
in particular we wanted to investigate their rate of reduction following the end of the visuo-
tactile stimulation in the rubber hand illusion.   
1.2.2 What is the sense of body ownership? 
When we look at our hands, we immediately feel that they belong to us. The term “sense of 
body ownership” refers to this subjective sense (or feeling) that a body part or body belongs to 
one’s self. One hurdle to overcome with studying such subjective experiences is how to 
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measure them, and to this end, the aforementioned explicit and implicit outcome measures of 
the sense of body ownership have been developed. Somewhat more challenging than the 
practical problem of how to measure a subjective experience, the main issue with subjective 
experiences is to try and understand what they are and why they exist, and accordingly, the 
philosophical discourse regarding the sense of body ownership have to large extent focused on 
this problem. Below I will present some philosophical viewpoints on the sense of body 
ownership before delving into the neuroscientific models of body ownership, and although 
there is an overlap between these two disciplines, the neuroscientific effort has, in contrast to 
the philosophical one, focused on elucidating the underlying perceptual and neural mechanisms 
(the ‘how’) rather than trying to explain what it is and why it exists (the ‘what’ and ‘why’).  
A review of the main philosophical viewpoints regarding the sense of body ownership was 
recently described in a philosophical essay by Fredrique de Vignemont, where she divided 
them into three main categories – the eliminativist, the irreductionist and the reductionist 
viewpoints (Frédérique de Vignemont, 2015). The eliminativist view is that there is nothing 
more than the mere physical properties of the things we experience, in the context of body 
ownership, there is no feeling of “mineness” and the sense of body ownership is nothing more 
than knowledge of the fact that one’s body belongs to one’s self (Bermúdez, 2011). This 
position is hard to reconcile with the reported experiences of body illusions where the 
participants report a sense of body ownership over inanimate limbs and bodies despite knowing 
it cannot be theirs (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Guterstam et al., 2011; Petkova & Ehrsson, 
2008). The irreductionist viewpoint on the other hand, holds that the there is indeed a feeling 
of “mineness”, and that the sense of ownership of one’s body is an irreducible sensation of the 
body which cannot be described in terms of any other bodily sensations or experiences. This 
irreductionist position is difficult to contest since it ultimately relies on ruling out every possible 
reductionist account and hence, I will not discuss it further in this thesis. 
The reductionist viewpoint(s) hold that the sense of body ownership can be reduced to other 
bodily sensations, where some of the most commonly held reductionist positions grounds the 
sense of body ownership in (i) the affective coloring of events or objects related to the physical 
body (F de Vignemont, 2017), (ii) the spatial boundaries of the physical body, within which 
once can have perceptual experiences (Martin, 1995), (iii) the sense of agency over the body  
(Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010) and (iv) a multisensory representation of the body (H. Ehrsson, 
2012; Henrik H. Ehrsson, 2020; Guterstam, 2016). According position (i), the sense of body 
ownership is viewed as the affective component of bodily perception, where a distinction 
between the purely descriptive and affective components of bodily perception is made. In 
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essence, the account suggests that disturbances in the sense of body ownership such as 
asomatognosia (failure to recognize body parts as one’s own) is the bodily equivalent of 
Capgras syndrome (Frédérique de Vignemont, 2018), where the patients suffering from 
Capgras syndrome recognize the physical features of familiar individuals but lack the normal 
affective reaction to them, subsequently interpreting the individuals as being imposters 
(Capgras & Reboul-Lachaux, 1994). This affective reaction towards the physical body is 
proposed to be ultimately aimed at protecting the body from harm. However, this reductionist 
position of body ownership fails to account for situations in which affective reactions toward 
physical bodies is unaccompanied by body ownership, for instance a mother carrying her child 
most likely experience affective reactions toward the body of the child, and likely display a 
protective behavior if the child’s body is threatened, but does not experience any sense of 
ownership of the child’s body. 
Position (ii) holds that the sense of ownership is grounded in the spatial boundaries within 
which one can have sensory experiences (i.e., the borders of the physical body) (Martin, 1995), 
which seems implausible based on the literature on tool use that show that using tools extend 
the sense of touch to include the tools (Maravita & Iriki, 2004), as well as extends the space 
within which visuo-tactile stimuli are integrated (the so-called peri-personal space) (Guterstam 
et al., 2018). Moreover, this reductionist position is further contradicted by the fact that the 
sense of ownership does not necessarily correlate with the recalibration of limb position (Holle 
et al., 2011; Rohde et al., 2011), which one would expect if the sense of body ownership was 
completely grounded in the spatial position of one’s body.  
Reductionist position (iii) holds that the feeling of ownership is grounded in the sense of agency 
(i.e., controlling the body) (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010). Intuitively, it seems plausible that the 
sense of ownership would be grounded in the sense of agency, since the sense of controlling 
one’s body presupposes a sense of said body being one’s own. However, this viewpoint also 
falls on empirical evidence, since the sense of body ownership is maintained during passive 
movement, while there’s no sense of agency and paralyzed patients do not commonly report 
disturbances in the sense of body ownership, while the sense of agency over the affected body 
parts is diminished, dissociating the two phenomena. Furthermore, behavioral studies 
employing body illusions have displayed a perceptual dissociation between the two 
phenomena, indicating that they are separate experiences (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014a). 
Finally, the reductionist position (iv) holds that the sense of body ownership is grounded in a 
multisensory representation of the body, which is built up and maintained according to 
principles of multisensory binding and integration (see below). This position draws support 
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from the neurological literature on patients with disturbances in the sense of body ownership, 
who often present with lesions in multisensory brain regions (Critchley, 1953; Feinberg et al., 
2010; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009), as well as from the neuroscientific literature on body illusions 
which show that the sense of body ownership obeys multisensory congruence rules (Costantini 
& Haggard, 2007; Henrik H. Ehrsson, 2020; Gentile et al., 2013; Guterstam et al., 2013; 
Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014b; Longo et al., 2008; Shimada et al., 2009) and is associated with 
activity in multisensory brain regions (H Henrik Ehrsson et al., 2004; H. Henrik Ehrsson et al., 
2005; Gentile et al., 2013; Guterstam et al., 2013). The studies in this thesis are to a large extent 
consistent with this reductionist position (iv) (although the presence of an irreducible 
component cannot be ruled out) and while being an elegant solutions to the question of what 
the sense of body ownership is, the remaining question of why it exists is discussed at the end 
of this thesis. 
Parallel to the philosophical discourse, various neuroscientific models of ownership, driven by 
empirical findings on body illusions and theorized around the integration of visual, tactile and 
proprioceptive signals have been developed. In the first model of body ownership proposed by 
Botvinick and Cohen, the sense of body ownership is brought about by tri-modal integration 
of vision, touch and proprioception (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998); if I see my hand in an 
anatomical position that is congruent with the proprioceptive signals, while receiving sensory 
input from the hand, the brain will interpret the hand my own. Furthermore, Botvinick and 
Cohen state that “the illusion’s spurious reconciliation of visual and tactile inputs relies upon 
a distortion of position sense” (p.756), a  proposition that is challenged by the fact that the 
recalibration of hand position sense can happen in the absence of any changes in the subjective 
sense of body ownership (Holmes et al., 2004, 2006; Makin et al., 2008) and that some rubber 
hand illusion studies failed to detect any correlation between changes in hand position sense 
and the sense of body ownership (Holle et al., 2011; Rohde et al., 2011). Tsakiris and 
colleagues, on the other hand, proposed that the sense of body ownership is brought about by 
three critical comparisons, the first between the visual features of the viewed body and an 
internal representation of the physical body, the second between the position of the viewed 
body and the proprioceptively felt body, and finally between the viewed and felt tactile input 
(Tsakiris, 2010). However, the fact that ownership of invisible body parts is possible 
(Guterstam et al., 2013) provide empirical evidence contradicting this model, since the visual 
input of a hand is missing, and hence the correspondence of the first comparison should 
decrease. Finally, Makin et al. placed great emphasis on visuo-tactile integration in peri-
personal space leading to referral of touch to the viewed body part, which provides positive 
feedback to existing processes of visuo-proprioceptive recalibration updating the multisensory 
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representation of the body (Makin et al., 2008). These neurocognitive models, although some 
are yet to be dismissed by empirical evidence, have to a large degree been replaced by 
computational models of multisensory integration. The computational models formalize many 
of the empirically discovered perceptual rules that have been proposed in the neurocognitive 
models on body ownership while also taking into account sensory and non-sensory prior 
perceptual experiences and assumptions regarding the relationship of the sensory signals.  
1.2.3 Multisensory mechanisms 
In our everyday lives, the brain is constantly showered with sensory signals which have to be 
organized, filtered and (some subsets of the signals) integrated in order to give rise to coherent 
perceptual experiences. For instance, on my daily walk to work, I hear and see the cars passing, 
I feel the vibrations in ground as they pass right by me, and if the car is old enough, I might 
even smell the gases expunged from the exhaust pipe. Somehow, all these sensory signals in 
all the modalities are integrated and I perceive a car passing as a coherent percept across all 
modalities. How the brain fuses the information from the different senses is one of the core 
questions of our perception and can in fact be formulated as two separate problems. The first 
is the question of how the information is interpreted to have one and the same causal origin i.e., 
how come I perceive it as one car passing instead of two or more cars, all individually 
generating one of the unimodal sensory signals? Second, how is this information integrated, 
i.e., having accepted that the visual input, sound, and vibrations all came from the same car in 
the example above, how are the signals from the different sensory modalities integrated in the 
brain? The latter has for decades been in the spotlight of multisensory perceptual research, 
sparked by findings dating back to the 1980s when Barry Stein and Alex Meredith discovered 
multisensory neurons in the superior colliculus in cats that responded to both visual and 
auditory stimuli (Meredith & Stein, 1986). Interestingly, the responses to multisensory stimuli 
were integrated in a superadditive manner, where the response to both visual and auditory 
stimuli (presented spatially congruent and within a limited temporal window) were larger than 
the responses to each stimulus presented alone. This superadditive integration became the 
hallmark mechanism of multisensory integration through which the brain amplifies 
biologically important stimuli. Since their discovery, other multisensory neuronal populations 
that integrate visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals have been discovered in both humans 
and non-human primates (Avillac et al., 2007; M. S. Graziano et al., 1997; M. S. Graziano & 
Gross, 1993; Michael S. A. Graziano et al., 2000; Rizzolatti et al., 1981). However, focusing 
purely on the integration of sensory information, without addressing which stimuli are 
integrated and the criteria for the integration misses out on the vital process of deciding to 
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which degree to integrate the stimuli or not, since all stimuli are clearly not integrated. In the 
example with the cars above, if I would see a car pass right by me while hearing a faint engine 
sound in the distance, it would not make sense to integrate these signals, since they most likely 
have two sources of origin, and luckily this does not happen (although the introduction of near 
silent electrical cars has fooled me once or twice). This indicates that prior to integrating 
multimodal stimuli, the brain decides which stimuli to integrate, which has been empirically 
observed and reported in multisensory experiments previously (referred to as the ‘multisensory 
binding’ or ‘multisensory assignment’ problem), but until recently was not formalized in the 
multisensory models. To this end, a computational theoretical framework based on 
probabilistic models of multisensory perception has been developed (Körding et al., 2007). 
Probabilistic models of multisensory perception are not new in the sense that similar ideas were 
first proposed by Hermann Von Helmholtz in the 19th century, where he in his “Handbuch der 
physiologischen Optik” (Treatise on Physiological Optics) (1856-67) proposed a probabilistic 
model of visual perception based on an integration of both prior beliefs and the actual sensory 
stimuli which he called “unbewusster schluss” (unconscious inference) (Helmholtz, 1867). The 
modern-day Bayesian causal inference model has striking similarities to this early framework, 
although it has been formalized in detail. In this causal inference framework, the brain solves 
the problem of multisensory binding by a process of causal inference, where the brain infers a 
common cause of stimuli based on spatial proximity, simultaneity, temporal correlation, and 
prior perceptual experiences, and, in turn, this inferred causal structure determines to what 
extent the sensory signals should be integrated (Körding et al., 2007).  
The Bayesian causal inference model was initially proposed for bimodal audio-visual stimuli 
where the empirical evidence has shown a high compliance with the model (Körding et al., 
2007) and almost a decade later, an adapted version of the model was proposed for the sense 
of body ownership (Samad et al., 2015). The proposed model was applied to the rubber hand 
illusion, designed as an integration of visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals relaying spatial 
and temporal information underlying the inference of body ownership (Fig. 1). Simulations of 
the model indicated that the inference to a common cause of the seen and felt touches would 
be made if the hands were within 30 cm of each other (spatial rule), and if the delivered seen 
and felt touches are synchronous (temporal rule). Interestingly, the model also predicted that 
inference to a common cause could be made in the absence of visuo-tactile stimulation, which 
the authors reproduce in an empirical experiment, however, methodological differences and 
the fact that the authors compare the subjective illusion ratings to a null result rather than to a 
control condition might explain why similar results have not been observed in other studies 
(Guterstam et al., 2019). Furthermore, the neural mechanisms and correlates of such a Bayesian 
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causal inference model was recently examined in a study on both macaques and humans (Fang 
et al., 2019). In this study, the premotor cortex was identified as a brain region that implements 
a form of Bayesian causal inference to the multisensory binding problem of body ownership. 
Taken together, this model proposes that a process of inference to a common cause happens in 
the rubber hand illusion (i.e., interpreting the visual and tactile signals as originating from the 
same hand) leading to the fusion of the visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals, which further 
causes a change in perceived hand location. In Study I, we wanted to investigate the causal 
relationship between changes in hand localization and the sense of body ownership in the 
rubber hand illusion. In particular we wanted to examine whether the recalibration of hand 
position sense towards the rubber hand was a necessary condition for experiencing the rubber 
hand illusion or not, since as opposed to the causal inference model, some of the competing 
neurocognitive models were based on either this assumption or predicted that changing the 
correspondence between felt and viewed hand position would impact the illusory sense of 
ownership (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris, 2010). 
 
Figure 1. The causal inference model of body ownership proposed by Samad et al. (2015). Inference to a 
common cause (C=1) of the spatial and temporal visual signals from the rubber hand (Sv and Tv), spatial 
proprioceptive signals from the real hand (Sp) and temporal tactile signals from the real hand (Tt) leads to 
the sense of ownership of the rubber hand. The inference to separate causes (C=2) leads to the segregation 
of the signals arising from the rubber hand and the real hand, and no sense of ownership of the rubber hand 
ensues.  
1.2.4 Neural correlates of body ownership 
Lesion studies on patients with disturbances in the sense of body ownership have identified the 
frontal, parietal and temporal lobes (Feinberg et al., 2010; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009) as well as 
subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia (Halligan et al., 1993) and posterior insula 
(Baier & Karnath, 2008) to be involved the generation of a coherent bodily percept. However, 
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the neuroanatomical bases have only been outlined with a relatively low precision since the 
lesions usually span over several different functional brain regions and also involve subcortical 
structures, reducing the neuroanatomical specificity. Furthermore, inter-individual variations 
in the underlying anatomy as well as the shape and size of the lesion make group comparisons 
difficult. In light of this, recent studies on the neuroanatomical bases of the sense of body 
ownership have thus focused on electrophysiological studies in non-human primates as well as 
neuroimaging studies in humans aimed at identifying multisensory regions capable of 
performing the integration proposed to underlie the sense of body ownership.  
Electrophysiological studies in non-human primates have identified neuronal populations in 
the frontal (M. S. Graziano et al., 1997; Rizzolatti et al., 1981) and parietal (Avillac et al., 2007; 
Michael S. A. Graziano et al., 2000) lobe that contain multisensory neuronal populations which 
integrate visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals. Furthermore, these neurons seem to have 
visual receptive fields (RF) that extend beyond the physical borders of the body to include the 
volume of space surrounding the body (M. S. Graziano, 1999), the so-called peri-personal 
space (Brozzoli et al., 2014). These RFs are anchored on the limbs, i.e., if the limb is moved, 
the RF of the specified neuron moves along with the limb and are unaffected by gaze direction 
(Fogassi et al., 1996; M. S. Graziano, 1999; M. S. A. Graziano & Gross, 1998). In macaques, 
these neurons have been identified in areas that are equivalent to the human premotor cortex, 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and posterior parietal cortices (PPC) as well as putamen (however, 
see (Culham & Valyear, 2006; Grefkes & Fink, 2005) for a cautionary reminder of such inter-
species comparisons). Extending the work on non-human primates, neuroimaging studies on 
humans have identified brain regions that integrate body related visual-tactile-proprioceptive 
signals in fronto-parietal and cerebellar regions. The ventral premotor cortex (PMv), 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and supramarginal gyrus (SMG) as well as the cerebellum have been 
shown to display superadditive brain activity (measured as the BOLD signal, see methods) to 
bi-modal visual and tactile stimuli centered on the upper limb and furthermore that the same 
regions are responsive to stimuli presented in peri-personal space (Beauchamp et al., 2010; 
Gentile et al., 2011, 2013; Hadjikhani & Roland, 1998; Huang et al., 2012; Lloyd et al., 2003; 
Makin et al., 2007; Saito et al., 2003; Sereno & Huang, 2006). In a series of experiments, 
Brozzoli and colleagues showed that these areas displayed an adaptation to repeated visual 
stimuli close to the hand (Brozzoli et al., 2011), and furthermore that the activity in these areas 
is anchored on the hand, since the neural response shifted along with the hand when the hand’s 
position was changed (Brozzoli et al., 2012).  Such neuronal populations are the ideal 
candidates for the type of multisensory integration processes that have been proposed to 
underlie the sense of body ownership.  
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Consistent with these electrophysiological studies on non-human primates and neuroimaging 
studies on humans focusing on multisensory integration, fMRI experiments on human 
participants using bodily illusions as model systems for the sense of body ownership have 
identified the PMv, PPC, IPS and cerebellum to be involved in generating the sense of body 
ownership (H Henrik Ehrsson et al., 2004; Gentile et al., 2013; Grivaz et al., 2017; Guterstam 
et al., 2013; Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2016). These results have been reliably reproduced 
for individual limbs (H Henrik Ehrsson et al., 2004; Gentile et al., 2013), whole bodies (Gentile 
et al., 2015; Petkova et al., 2011) and new variations of the bodily illusions such as the invisible 
hand illusion (Guterstam et al., 2013). Apart from showing increased activity in those regions 
during the illusory experience of body ownership over a rubber hand or body, the activity in 
the PMv in particular has shown a correlation with behavioral outcome measures of the sense 
of body ownership (H Henrik Ehrsson et al., 2004; Gentile et al., 2013). Taken together, these 
results provide converging evidence that the sense of body ownership is reliant upon 
multisensory integration in brain regions housing neurons capable of such integration. 
1.2.5 Disorders of body ownership 
“She denied that the affected limbs were hers and said that ‘yours’ or another’s were in bed 
with her. When she was shown that they were attached to her and that the arm in question 
merged with her shoulder and that it must be hers she said: ‘But my eyes and my feelings 
don’t agree, and I must believe my feelings. I know they look like mine, but I can feel they are 
not, and I can’t believe my eyes” - C. W. Olsen, 1937, cited in Feinberg (2010) 
Most healthy humans do not reflect over the existence of a sense ownership over their body 
and limbs, the feeling exists by default, and is only attended to once disturbances of it are 
evident. Such disturbances have been described in the neurological literature, where damage to 
frontal or parietal regions have been reported to lead to syndromes of asomatognosia or 
somatoparaphrenia (Critchley, 1953; Feinberg et al., 2010; Gerstmann, 1942; Vallar & Ronchi, 
2009), where asomatognosia refers to the loss of ownership of a limb and somatoparaphrenia 
describes the loss of ownership of a limb combined with (often confabulatory) attribution of 
the limb to someone else (as captured in the quote above from Dr. Clarence W. Olsen at a 
meeting of the Los Angeles Neurological Society in 1937, cited in (Feinberg et al., 2010)). 
Apart from lesions in frontal and parietal regions, some lesion studies have also implicated the 
insula and basal ganglia (Baier & Karnath, 2008; Halligan et al., 1993) to be involved in the 
processes underlying the sense of body ownership. Worth noting is that these disturbances 
cannot be explained by impairments in unimodal vision or touch, since these patients can see 
their hand and sometimes also have intact tactile sensations from the hand. The correspondence 
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between these lesion studies and the neuroimaging studies combined with the fact that the 
displayed disability cannot be explained by unimodal impairments further strengthen the idea 
that the sense of body ownership is grounded in multisensory integration processes in these 
brain regions.  
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of two principally different disorders of body ownership. On the left, a patient with 
asomatognosia or somatoparaphrenia experiences no ownership of an existing physical limb, whereas on the 
right, an amputee experiences ownership of a physically non-existing limb. 
While asomatognosia and somatoparaphrenia describes instances in which patients fail to 
attribute physical limbs to themselves, the opposite problem has been observed in amputees 
(Fig. 2). Following the amputation of a limb some patients report a vivid sensation of the limb 
still being attached to their body, and even more problematic, they can sometimes experience 
pain in this phantom limb (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998). Interestingly, after mapping out 
tactile stimuli on the stump, the rubber hand illusion can be induced in this patient population 
by brushing on the stump and corresponding places on the rubber hand, and the illusion is 
accompanied by neural activity in the same multisensory brain regions seen in healthy 
volunteers during the rubber hand illusion (H Henrik Ehrsson et al., 2008; Schmalzl et al., 
2013). Furthermore, in some of these patients, inducing the rubber hand or virtual hand illusion 
can ameliorate the experience of and pain from the phantom limb (Chan et al., 2007; 
Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996), highlighting some of the potential therapeutic 
applications of this research. Nevertheless, the precise relationship and perceptual and neural 
similarities between the illusory sense of ownership of the rubber hand and the experience of 
phantom limbs has yet to be investigated in detail. 
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1.3 THE SENSE OF AGENCY 
1.3.1 What is the sense of agency? 
In natural things, agent is often said of the principle of another’s motion insofar as it is 
other. By motion, we mean here whatever passes from potency to act in a given matter.    
- Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Kitāb al-Shifā (Book of Healing, 1027) 
Looking at our hands again, we might notice that aside from the feeling that the hands are ours 
(body ownership), when we move them, we also feel that we can control them, we get a sense 
that we are the agents performing the action. This sense of controlling one’s actions and through 
them events in the outside world is the most commonly used definition of the sense of agency 
(Haggard, 2017; Haggard & Chambon, 2012). Although in our everyday lives and actions, this 
feeling is phenomenological thin, we become highly aware of it in situations of mismatch 
between what we intended to do and what actually happened. Historically, the sense of agency 
has been studied in paradigms aimed at elucidating the feeling of control of external events, 
namely the sensory feedback from button presses or manipulation of physical controllers, for 
example by having participants press a button and receive an auditory tone or visual flash 
feedback, or control a mouse or cursor on a screen (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Christopher 
D. Frith et al., 2000; Haggard et al., 2002; J. Moore & Haggard, 2008; Voss et al., 2010). The 
sense of agency is in these cases perturbed by manipulating the sensory feedback, for instance 
by excluding the tone feedback or introducing incongruencies in the movement of the cursor. 
Through these experiments, the sense of agency has been studied both behaviorally and 
neurally. Behaviorally, these experiments have elucidated some perceptual rules of the sense 
of agency, including the action rule (i), the temporal rule (ii) and the spatial rule (iii). The action 
rule (i) proposes that the sense of agency is reliant on active movement generation, without 
performing any movement, for instance in passive movements, the sense of agency is less likely 
to be present (Haggard & Chambon, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2008). The temporal rule (ii) states 
that the temporal relationship between action and sensory feedback needs to be consistent and 
without large delays, since both large delays (over 150 ms) and unpredictable delays have been 
shown to decrease the sense of agency (Daprati et al., 1997; Daprati & Sirigu, 2002). Finally, 
the spatial rule (ii) states that the action (or the expected outcome of the action) and the actual 
outcome need to be spatially congruent, for instance if the cursor on the screen moves to the 
left when the agent moved the mouse to the right, this would constitute a spatial incongruency 
that impairs the sense of agency. Such spatial incongruencies seem to be tolerated if they are 
kept below an orientation mis-match of 15 degrees (Farrer, Franck, Georgieff, et al., 2003; 
Farrer, Franck, Paillard, et al., 2003; Franck et al., 2001). 
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Similar to the sense of body ownership, the sense of agency also struggles with the same issues 
of how to be quantified. One way to quantify the sense of agency is to simply ask the 
participants or have them rate a set of statements regarding the experience of agency. However, 
such explicit judgements are subject to cognitive bias, task compliance and suggestibility, and 
in fact, studies have shown that participants are more prone to self-attribute actions if the 
outcome is positive (Bradley, 1978). Furthermore, explicit measures tend to reduce the sense 
of agency to a judgement of agency, a reduction that is not uncomplicated and has led some 
authors to propose a distinction between a pre-reflective low-level form av agency and a 
reflective (explicit) form of agency (Synofzik et al., 2008). In this thesis, I will refrain from 
making such a distinction, since only explicit behavioral measures of agency were used in the 
included studies. However, to avoid the pitfalls associated with explicit agency judgements, a 
lot of the literature on the sense of agency have used implicit outcome measures of agency. 
One of the most widely used is the so-called intentional binding paradigm, in which the 
perceived time between an action and its sensory consequences is compressed in situations of 
a high sense of agency compared to control conditions (Haggard et al., 2002; J. W. Moore & 
Obhi, 2012). In essence, the intentional binding paradigm is based on the assumption that self-
generated actions and outcomes will be causally associated, leading to the perception of the 
action happening later in time than in actually did, and perception that the outcome happened 
earlier in time than it did (Fig. 3) compared to actions that are not followed by any outcome 
and outcomes that are not preceded by any action. Furthermore, the perceived compression of 
time between action and outcome is smaller in passive movements, while involuntary 
movements have even been showed to expand the perceived time between action and outcome 
(Haggard & Clark, 2003).  Intentional binding has shown a high correlation with the subjective 
judgement of agency and has been widely used as a proxy for the implicit sense of agency 
(Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Haggard, 2005, 2017; Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard & Chambon, 
2012; J. W. Moore & Obhi, 2012; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003; Wolpe et al., 2013) (but see 
(David et al., 2008; Obhi & Hall, 2011; Synofzik et al., 2008) for arguments against the use of 
intentional binding as a proxy for the sense of agency).  
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Figure 3. Schematic illustration of the intentional binding paradigm. In A the participants press a button an receive 
a tone feedback. The perceived timing of the button press and tone will be closer to each other in trials when the 
button press produces a tone than in trials with either just a button press or just a tone. In B, the participants 
receive transcranial magnetic stimulation over the primary motor cortex, generating a twitch in their finger, which 
in turn produces a tone feedback. The perceived timing of the twitch and tone are farther from each other in trials 
with his involuntary twitch and tone than trials with just the twitch or just the tone. Illustration based on Haggard 
& Clark (2003). 
1.3.2 The comparator and beyond 
”I trust that I now have made clear what the ‘idea of a movement’ is, which must precede it 
in order that it be voluntary. It is not the thought of the innervation which the movement 
requires. It is the anticipation of the movement’s sensible effects, resident or remote, and 
sometime very remote indeed” – William James, Principles of psychology (1890) 
The most popular model of the sense of agency draws inspiration from motor control theories, 
in particular the so-called comparator model, which was initially developed to describe how 
the brain monitors and correct goal directed action (Sarah-Jayne Blakemore et al., 2002; 
Christopher D. Frith et al., 2000; Wolpert & Kawato, 1998). The comparator model describes 
the sense of agency as arising following a comparison between the predicted and actual sensory 
feedback. This theory is grounded in the conception that somewhere between the decision to 
perform an action and generating the movement, a copy of the planned action is generated in 
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the brain. This so-called efference copy is used to compute a prediction of the sensory changes 
that would accompany the intended action, analogous to the “idea of a movement” proposed 
by William James in the quote above (James, 1890). This sensory prediction is then compared 
to the actual sensory feedback, and if the predicted and actual sensory feedback match, a sense 
of agency of the action is generated. This implies the sense of agency is a retrospective self-
attribution of one’s actions and is supported by the fact that perturbing the sensory feedback 
decreases the sense of agency while priming the participants with the outcome increases the 
sense of agency (Aarts et al., 2005; S. -J Blakemore et al., 2003; Sarah-Jayne Blakemore et al., 
2002; Farrer, Franck, Georgieff, et al., 2003). However, some experiments have suggested that 
the sense of agency is also computed partly by a prospective component, where implicit 
measures of agency indicate that some form of agency is independent of the actual sensory 
feedback. In one experiment, participants performed an action and received a tone feedback in 
only some of the trials. The intentional binding showed that participants experienced the time 
at which an action occurred to be later in blocks which had a high probability of a tone 
following an action (75%) compared to blocks with a low probability of a tone following the 
action (50%), even in trials where no tone was presented (Fig. 4), indicating the presence of a 
prospective component of agency that operates in the absence of reafferent sensory information 
and is modulated by the predictability of the outcome (Voss et al., 2010). 
 
 
Figure 4. The prospective component of agency. The figure schematically illustrates the results from (Voss, 2010), 
wherein participants had two conditions of stimuli, one in which there was a high probability of a tone following 
an action (75%) and one in which there was a low probability of a tone following an action (50%). The binding 
of the perceived timing of the action closer to the tone happened even in trials with no tone, which is shown in the 
figure. Interestingly, the binding was significantly larger in the condition with the high predictability of tone 
feedback compared to the condition with low predictability.   
Furthermore, the comparator model fails to encompass instances in which agentive experiences 
arise without the generation of any motor commands. For instance, it has been shown that 
participants in a pantomime task, where the participants see the hands of another person 
performing actions can experience agency over the viewed actions, as long as a predictive 
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account of the movements can be made, for instance by giving the participant verbal 
instructions for impending actions (Wegner et al., 2004). The sense of agency experienced in 
this situation cannot be accounted for by the comparator model since no movements are being 
made by the participants. One might argue that by viewing another person’s hands in the 
anatomical positions of one’s own hand performing an action while hearing predictions of the 
actions might entail motor imagery or other anticipatory processes, which might produce the 
sensory predictions necessary for the comparator model. However, this would indicate that 
either the efference copy is not as precise as previously thought (i.e., it is not a precise 
representation of the motor commands), or there are other processes independent of efference 
copies that can account for such predictions of sensory feedback, at the expense of losing the 
very characteristic of the comparator model, namely the comparison between efference copy-
based predictions and the actual sensory feedback (Fig. 5). Intriguingly enough, a recent study 
on sensory attenuation, whose model to a large extent is based on the same efference copy-
based predictions of sensory feedback as the comparator model, has shown that attenuation 
effects are seen with motor imagery devoid of any actual motor output (Kilteni et al., 2018). 
These results indicate that motor imagery can produce detailed and precisely timed information 
used to calculate the sensory predictions. However, whether these results translate to the sense 
of agency remains to be investigated.  
In general, what was lacking in the literature was a coherent model of the sense of agency that 
takes into account prior knowledge and predictions as well as reafferent sensory signals and 
integrates and weighs this information in the process of generating agentive experiences. In a 
recent paper, Legaspi and colleagues, use the intentional binding paradigm as a model system 
for the sense of agency to propose a causal inference model of agency (Legaspi & Toyoizumi, 
2019). The proposed Bayesian causal inference model integrates the sensory predictions and 
reafferent sensory signals (and weighs them according to reliability) which in turn infers 
causality of the events or not. Their model could account for the intentional binding effects 
from both (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003) who showed decreased intentional binding in non-
voluntary movements, and (Wolpe et al., 2013) who showed that decreasing the reliability of 
the tone feedback decreased the shift in perceived action timing towards the tone. In essence, 
the proposed model suggests that given a strong prior and noisy sensory feedback would lead 
to the estimate of agency relying more on the prospective component (i.e., prior known causal 
relationships) whereas a weak prior and reliable sensory feedback would lead to the estimate 
of agency relying more on the retrospective component, a notion consistent with Bayesian 
probabilistic models (Chater et al., 2006; Körding & Wolpert, 2006). Interestingly the proposed 
model also suggests that if the sensory signals are reliable enough, a sense of agency can 
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emerge for unintended actions, which serves as an empirical prediction that can be tested to 
validate the model. 
 
Figure 5. The comparator model of agency. Intentions are transformed to motor commands through a “inverse 
model” (I.M) which also generates an efference copy (E.C) used by the “forward model” (F.M) to create sensory 
predictions which are compared to the actual sensory feedback. The green field represents the processes that 
happen before the action, and thus represent the prospective component of agency, whereas the grey field indicate 
the processes after action execution, thus representing the retrospective component of agency. The “priors” in the 
causal inference model of agency is thus contained within the green field, since they represent the predictive 
components of agency. 
1.3.3 Action awareness, intentions and causality 
Wittgenstein famously asked, “What is left if I subtract the fact that my hand goes up from the 
fact that I raised my hand?” (Wittgenstein, 1953). One obvious answer to this is intention. 
When comparing voluntary and involuntary movements of our limbs, one thing that stands out 
is the presence or absence of the intention to move. Ranging back to the seminal study by 
Jonathan Libet and colleagues (Libet et al., 1983), neuroscientist and psychologist have tried 
to decipher the neural correlates of intention. Using a setup where participants are asked to 
perform an action, while watching a rotating clock hand, and retrospectively indicating the 
point at which they decided to move, have enabled researchers to identify the so-called 
readiness potential (RP) (Libet et al., 1983; Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006). Using 
electroencephalography (EEG) and electrocorticography (ECoG), researchers managed to 
identify an increase in neural activity some hundred milliseconds up to one second before the 
participants actually moved (Ikeda et al., 1992; Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006; Yamamoto et al., 
2004). Interestingly, this RP is absent when patients with Gilles de la Tourette’s syndrome 
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(commonly known as Tourette’s syndrome) display uncontrollable motor and vocal tics but is 
present when the same patients are asked to voluntarily mimic their tics, linking the RP to the 
processes underlying intention (Karp et al., 1996; Obeso et al., 1981). Since the RP is intimately 
linked to intention which precedes the action itself as well as the sensory feedback, it serves as 
a potential substrate for the processes underlying the prospective sense of agency. The 
prospective component of agency can thus be conceptualized as arising following a comparison 
between the intentions and the predicted sensory feedback (Synofzik et al., 2008), prior to the 
comparison with the actual sensory feedback. Interestingly, such a comparison was actually 
proposed in the latest version of the comparator model (C. Frith, 2005; Christopher D. Frith et 
al., 2000) (although it was not proposed to be involved in the self-attributing process but rather 
in the updating of the inverse model). This has some interesting implications, because in order 
to have a forward model generating congruent predicted sensory feedback, there has to be some 
kind of established causality, i.e., the sensory feedback from the actions need to have an a priori 
established causal link to the actions. If the a priori causal link between action and outcome is 
weak, then the sense of agency of the action would be lower – imagine walking into a room 
and flicking the light switch, and instead of the light turning on, the Swedish national anthem 
starts playing. In this case, there is no temporal or spatial incongruency between action and 
outcome, but their causal contingencies based on prior experiences is low, which would likely 
impair the sense of agency, and many of us would probably assume the action and outcome to 
be unrelated and only coincided by accident. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the 
perceived sense of agency in trials with a high predictability of action outcomes compared to 
trials with low predictability of action outcomes. The perceived sense of agency was 
significantly higher in the high predictability group (A. Sato, 2009), consistent with similar 
effects observed for intentional binding (J. Moore & Haggard, 2008; Voss et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, Sato and colleagues show that priming participants with either congruent, 
incongruent or neutral primes in relation to the outcome of the action associated with a key 
press modulated the sense of agency more in the high predictability trials than in the low 
predictability trials, indicating that the prospective and retrospective components are integrated 
and weighted to produce a coherent sense of agency (A. Sato, 2009). These causality dependent 
predictions seem to be highly flexible, where causal contingencies has been shown to be 
updated on a trial to trial basis (J. Moore & Haggard, 2008). 
As stated above, the Bayesian causal inference model of agency predicted that a sense of 
agency could arise for unintended actions, which begs the question of whether it is possible to 
have voluntary, but unintended actions? Previous studies have shown that it is possible to 
generate voluntary actions without the awareness of any active intentions to move the limb in 
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said matter, but rather the intention was aimed at some other task, which as a by-product 
generated a voluntary action leading to a movement of the limb (Newport & Gilpin, 2011; 
Stone et al., 2018). The interesting question remained of whether these actions without aware 
intentions would update the sensorimotor system in the same manner as aware actions, which 
has some implications for the explanatory models used to explain these sensorimotor 
recalibrations. In the prism adaptation literature, it has for long been known that active 
voluntary movements generate a larger, faster and more reliable visuo-proprioceptive 
recalibration compared to passive movements during the wearing of prism glasses that displace 
the visual field (Beckett, 1980; Fernández-Ruiz et al., 2004; Rossetti et al., 1998; Welch et al., 
1979). This difference has been attributed to salient error signals which update the visuo-
proprioceptive maps more during active than passive movements, grounded in a hypothesized 
distinction between intersensory and sensorimotor mismatch. (Chapman et al., 2010; Rossetti 
et al., 1998). In Study III, we wanted to investigate whether the same pattern of increased 
recalibration is seen in active conditions without any aware intentions nor any aware actions 
and compare this to passive conditions without any aware movements. This would indicate 
whether awareness of intention or movement is necessary for these recalibration mechanisms.  
1.3.4 Disorders of agency 
Most research on the sense of agency in clinical populations has been done on patients suffering 
from schizophrenia, where symptoms such as delusions of control and thought insertion have 
been attributed to disturbances in the neural mechanisms underlying the sense of agency 
(Daprati et al., 1997; Synofzik et al., 2010; Synofzik & Voss, 2010). In short, the theories 
postulate that schizophrenic patients fail to self-attribute thoughts, feelings and ideas and 
instead interpret them as originating from external agents. Rephrased within the comparator 
model framework, their ability to make adequate sensory predictions is impaired (Chris D Frith 
et al., 2000). Schizophrenic patients have been shown to be more prone to attribute viewed 
external actions to themselves than healthy controls, indicating an impairment in making self-
other distinctions (Synofzik et al., 2010). Furthermore, these findings are supported by 
behavioral data using the intentional binding paradigm, where schizophrenic patients have been 
shown to have increased intentional binding compared to a control group, and that they do not 
display the same modulation by the probability of tone presentation as the healthy volunteers, 
but instead seem to rely more on retrospective components for agency judgements (Voss et al., 
2010). The impairment in the ability to make adequate sensory predictions is corroborated by 
findings from the sensory attenuation literature, which is based on the notion that healthy 
individuals perceive the sensory effects of their own actions as weaker than externally produced 
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sensory effects. Schizophrenic individuals display a pattern of less attenuation to self-generated 
sensory signals (S. J. Blakemore et al., 2000; Shergill et al., 2005), indicating that schizophrenic 
patients have impairments in generating adequate sensory predictions of their actions, which is 
likely to mainly impair the prospective component of agency.  
Other neuropsychological populations where disturbances in the sense of agency has been 
proposed to be central for the displayed disability is in patients suffering from the anarchic 
hand syndrome. The anarchic hand syndrome is usually associated with focal lesions in the 
frontal lobe, parietal lobe and corpus callosum as well as with neurodegenerative diseases such 
as corticobasal degeneration (Biran & Chatterjee, 2004; Doody & Jankovic, 1992; Fisher, 
2000; Pacherie, 2007; Sala, 1998). The patients describe a loss of control over the actions of 
their hand and that it can perform actions without their intentions. Since these anarchic 
movements are perceived as involuntary, the sense of agency of them is diminished and patients 
sometimes even attribute the movements to an external agent, as captured in one of the earliest 
accounts of a patient with an anarchic hand syndrome, where a patient that had undergone a 
corpus callosotomy complained of repetitive unintentional grasping and attributed the 
movements to an external agent by stating that “there must be an evil spirit in the hand” (“Es 
muss wohl ein böser Geist in der Hand Sein”) (Goldstein, 1908). Interestingly, neuroimaging 
studies have found the anarchic hand movements to be associated with isolated activity in the 
primary motor cortex (Assal et al., 2007; Schaefer et al., 2010), lacking activity in the frontal 
motor areas normally seen with voluntary action. Furthermore, transcranial magnetic 
stimulation over the motor cortex, generating a movement in the arm of healthy participants, is 
experienced as involuntary and participants report a lack of agency over said movement 
(Haggard & Clark, 2003; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003). Conversely, electrical stimulation of the 
supplementary motor area (SMA) sometimes produced a feeling of an urge to move, without 
producing any movement (Fried et al., 1991), suggesting that intention and action planning in 
regions in the frontal lobe is part of the network that generates the predictions used for the 
processes underlying the sense of agency.  
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1.3.5 Neural correlates of agency 
Given the proposed models for agency suggested above, the investigations of the neural 
correlates of the sense of agency have focused on identifying brain regions associated with 
intention and action planning as well as regions capable of performing the comparisons 
between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Areas involved in intention and action planning 
such as the supplementary motor complex (SMA and pre-SMA) and premotor cortices have 
been suggested to be involved in the prospective component of agency (Cavazzana et al., 2015; 
Haggard, 2017; J. W. Moore et al., 2010), whereas multisensory regions receiving both motor 
and sensory input such as the posterior parietal cortex as well as regions involved in 
coordination such as the cerebellum have been proposed to be involved in the retrospective 
component of the sense of agency (Chambon et al., 2013; David et al., 2008; Farrer, Franck, 
Georgieff, et al., 2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Kang et al., 2015; Schnell et al., 2007; Uhlmann 
et al., 2020; Yomogida et al., 2010).   
Ever since the seminal studies on the neural substrates of the sense of agency by Farrer and 
colleagues (Farrer, Franck, Georgieff, et al., 2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002), there has been a 
tradition in the field of research on the sense of agency to make use of a paradigm with various 
degrees of temporal or spatial mismatch between action and outcome. The analyses have often 
focused on identifying the brain regions that display increased activity with increased 
mismatch, i.e., regions responsive to the loss of the sense of agency. These studies have 
identified the posterior parietal cortex, and in particular the right angular gyrus to be related to 
the loss of the sense of agency (David et al., 2008; Farrer, Franck, Georgieff, et al., 2003; Farrer 
& Frith, 2002; Yomogida et al., 2010). It is worth mentioning that these studies implemented 
some kind of temporal or spatial mismatch between action and sensory feedback in active 
movements, meaning that aside from a sensorimotor mismatch, there is also an inter-sensory 
mismatch, since they do not include passive control conditions. This has to be taken into 
account when interpreting these results since some studies have indicated that the angular gyrus 
is responsive to sudden changes in  multimodal sensory signals (Downar et al., 2000), which 
could confound these findings. The few studies that have investigated the neural correlates of 
the positive experience of agency, i.e., regions that display increased activity in response to 
increased action-feedback congruency have identified the insula to be associated with the 
experience of agency (Farrer, Franck, Georgieff, et al., 2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002). Finally, a 
meta-analysis identified the angular gyrus to be associated with the loss of agency, while the 
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anterior insula and the left pre- and post-central gyrus were associated with the positive 
experience of agency (Sperduti et al., 2011). 
However, what most of these studies lack is the investigation of agency over one’s body, i.e., 
the sense of agency in the presence of body ownership and how this differs from agency of 
external objects and events. When we perform a voluntary action, it necessarily involves some 
kind of macroscopic movement of our bodies or limbs, which in turn will generate some kind 
of sensory feedback from the body (tactile, proprioceptive, visual) before the external effects 
of the action generates any sensory feedback. Until the discovery of the moving rubber hand 
illusion, separating the two was difficult. To examine this, we conducted Study IV, a 
behavioral and neuroimaging study to investigate the sense of agency in a bodily context.  
1.4 THE SENSE OF BODY OWNERSHIP AND THE SENSE AGENCY – 
ADDITIVE OR INDEPENDENT? 
In our everyday lives we usually experience our bodies to encompass both the sense of body 
ownership and a sense of agency. We feel that our body belongs to us, and that we can control 
it. This experience does not need to be particularly salient or even conscious throughout the 
day, but rather just exist as a background common state. However, there is a clear dissociation 
between the feeling of ownership and the sense of agency when our body parts are passively 
moved. In that situation, we do not enjoy a sense of agency (since we did not perform or intend 
to perform a movement) but the sense of ownership does still remain anchored to the body part. 
The whole line of studies on intentional binding and the sense of agency indicate that the sense 
of agency is closely linked to efference copy-based predictions, whereas the feeling ownership 
can be induced using purely afferent signals (e.g., the rubber hand illusion). So, the question is, 
how do these two phenomena, the feeling of ownership and the sense of agency relate to one 
another? One view is that they are additive, i.e., that agency entails ownership (Tsakiris et al., 
2007). Since the sense of agency has been thought to require voluntary action, which can only 
be applied to the own body, this would include strong efferent and afferent cues, which would 
induce a feeling of ownership. This view then proposes that the sense of agency includes the 
feeling of ownership, plus some additional feeling of voluntary control. This has some 
interesting predictions regarding the neural correlates of agency and ownership, it predicts that 
agency and ownership have overlapping neural activations and further that the neural correlates 
of ownership are a subset of those of agency. The competing proposal on the relationship 
between the sense of body ownership and agency hold that they are two independent processes 
that rely on qualitatively distinct neural mechanisms. This model draws support from the 
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observation that paralyzed patients do not commonly report disturbances in the sense of body 
ownership as well as from recent behavioral experiments on the moving rubber hand illusion 
that have shown a behavioral dissociation of the two phenomena (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 
2014a). These findings support predictions about the neural correlates of ownership and agency 
that are separate (although some possible overlap cannot be completely ruled out). Comparing 
these two different models, one interesting question is whether agency of the own body obeys 
the same rules and is based on the same mechanisms as agency of external objects. If the sense 
of agency always entails ownership, then agency of the own body would not differ in terms of 
perceptual and neural mechanisms from agency of external objects, whereas if the sense of 
body ownership and agency are independent and interact in the case of agency over the body, 
the perceptual and neural mechanisms of agency over the body or external objects would differ. 
In Study IV, we devised a setup in which we can create a double dissociation between 
ownership and agency using the moving rubber hand illusion, and thus directly compare the 
neural correlates of the sense of agency of the body and the sense of agency of external objects. 
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2 AIMS 
2.1 STUDY I 
Study I investigated the causal relationship between changes in hand position sense (i.e., the 
proprioceptive drift) and the subjective sense of body ownership in the rubber hand illusion.  
 
2.2 STUDY II 
The aim of study II was to investigate the permanence and decay of the proprioceptive drift 
and the subjective sense of body ownership after the end of the visuo-tactile stimulation in the 
rubber hand illusion.  
 
2.3 STUDY III 
Study III aimed at elucidating if the visuo-proprioceptive recalibration of hand position sense 
differs between unconscious active and passive movements. 
 
2.4 STUDY IV 
Study IV aimed at investigating the neural correlates of the sense of body ownership and the 
sense of agency as well as their interaction. 
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3 METHODS 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
A total of 118 healthy participants were included in Study I-IV. All participants were naïve to 
the specific purposes of the experiment they participated in. Prior to participating, informed 
consent was obtained from all participants. The experiments were conducted in accordance 
with the declaration of Helsinki and approved by the Swedish Ethical Review Authority. 
3.2 QUESTIONNAIRES 
Throughout Study I-IV, questionnaires have been used to various extents to quantify the 
subjective experiences. Questionnaires aimed at quantifying the subjective experience of body 
ownership were presented after each experimental condition, whereas questionnaires aimed at 
probing the level of conscious perception of movements (Study I & III) were presented at the 
very end of the experiment. In some cases, where the experimental paradigm did not allow 
enough time to rate several statements, a shorter version or a single representative question 
aimed at probing one aspect of the illusory experience (Study II & III) was presented. The 
questionnaires aimed at evaluating the sense of body ownership were designed based on the 
original rubber hand illusion study (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), which has since been used and 
replicated in multiple studies on body ownership (Abdulkarim & Ehrsson, 2016; Kalckert & 
Ehrsson, 2012), whereas the questionnaire evaluating the sense of agency (Study IV) was 
based on the moving rubber hand illusion study (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012).  In general 
participants were asked to affirm or deny a set of statements probing various aspects of the 
illusory experience on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from (-3) corresponding to “completely 
disagree” to (+3) corresponding to “completely agree”, where (0) corresponds to “neither agree 
nor disagree”.  
Probing subjective experiences with questionnaires like this is not uncomplicated. Task 
compliance, suggestibility and cognitive biases are all potential confounders of the results, and 
to this end the questionnaire needs to be carefully designed to include efficient control 
statements, which were designed to be as similar as illusion statements as possible, but instead 
probing perceptual effects that we hypothesized would not be present. Furthermore, the 
comparisons of the questionnaire results were always done between conditions. In this way 
control conditions that were manipulated by one key factor (for instance visuo-tactile 
synchrony) that abolished the illusion, while keeping all other factors constant could be used 
to control for the potential confounders. Finally, the questionnaires were always used in 
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conjunction with or by comparison to implicit measures of body ownership such as the 
proprioceptive drift.   
3.3 PROPRIOCEPTIVE DRIFT 
The proprioceptive drift has been one of the most widely used implicit measures of the rubber 
hand illusion and has been shown to correlate with the illusory experience (Botvinick & Cohen, 
1998; Costantini & Haggard, 2007; H. Henrik Ehrsson et al., 2005; Guterstam et al., 2013; 
Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014b; Longo et al., 2008; Samad et al., 2015; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
The proprioceptive drift describes the change in hand localization that becomes apparent when 
comparing perceived hand localization prior to and after the induction of the rubber hand 
illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). There are different ways to measure hand localization by 
indicating the perceived position of one’s hand, including verbal reports, pointing using a 
digital aid and an inter-manual pointing task. Differences in perceived limb location have been 
observed depending on which type of method was used (Kammers et al., 2006), which is why 
in Study I-III, we use the same inter-manual pointing task in which participants are asked to 
close their eyes and then use their contralateral hand to point to the location in which they 
perceive their hand to be located. Specifically, the participants were asked to close their eyes 
and slide their left index finger along a metal ruler extending over both the participants hand 
and the viewed hand until they felt they were immediately above their right index finger. The 
metal ruler had distance markings only visible to the experimenter, and the ruler was uniform 
in size and shape without any identifiable cues to where on the ruler the participants left index 
finger was. The statistical analyses were made by subtracting the perceived hand location prior 
to the trial from the perceived hand location immediately after the end of the trial. The resulting 
difference was entered into a t-test, ANOVA or Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test depending on the 
experimental design and distribution of the data, and further compared between conditions. We 
opted for this inter-manual pointing task for several reasons, amongst others, we believe that 
the inter-manual pointing task to be an implicit outcome measure and less subjected to 
cognitive bias than verbal reports. Furthermore, we reason that locating the limb in space with 
the contralateral hand is important for inter-manual coordination and hence more ecologically 
valid than verbally reporting perceived limb location.  
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3.4 HAND DISPLACEMENT APPARATUS 
In Study I & III, we implemented the use of a new mechanical apparatus which allowed us to 
displace the participants hand passively without them noticing. The apparatus consisted of a 
platform on which the participants rested their hand which was composed of two sheets of 
Plexiglas resting on plastic tubes which in turn rested on a rubber mouse pad. The platform was 
connected with a rack bar to a cog wheel which in turn was connected to a brushless electrical 
engine (Micro Motors E192.24.625, Verderio Inferiore, Italy). The apparatus could displace 
the participants hand either medially or laterally with a speed of 0.9 mm/s. The displacement 
was done slow enough and without any noticeable vibration for the displacement to pass by 
unnoticed by the participants. A questionnaire regarding the awareness of any displacement 
was filled out by the participants after the experiment. None of the participants could report 
any sensations of displacement and anecdotally, most participants would express surprise once 
learning that their hand had been displaced several centimeters repeatedly during the 
experiment.  
3.5 HAND ILLUSION BOX 
In order to study the visuo-proprioceptive recalibration in Study III, we had to design an 
experimental setup which allowed us to induce a sensorimotor illusion that included 
unconscious active movements made by the participants. To this end, we developed the Hand 
Illusion Box (HI-box). Using a set of mirrors, cameras, a high refresh rate 3D-display and 3D-
goggles. We were able to create a sensorimotor illusion similar to the one described in the 
disappearing limb tricks (Newport & Gilpin, 2011; Stone et al., 2018). Seated in front of the 
hand illusion box and placing their hand inside the box, the participants would see their hand 
in 3D from a first-person perspective and with minimal delay (43 ms). The sensorimotor 
illusion was brought about by having the participants view their hand form the first-person 
perspective while asking them to hold their hand up in mid-air and keep it in the center of the 
screen. In the passive conditions, the participants were instructed to place their hand on the 
table, which consisted of the movable platform in the hand displacement apparatus from Study 
I, and simply relax while focusing on their hand. While holding their hand up in mid-air or 
resting it on the platform of the hand displacement apparatus in the active and passive 
conditions respectively, the viewed hand on the screen would start to shift medially. The shift 
was done so slowly that the participants did not notice it, and furthermore, in order to keep their 
hand in the middle of the screen in the active conditions, the participants would have to perform 
corrective movements laterally. In the passive conditions, the corrective movements were made 
by having the hand displacement apparatus displace the participants hand laterally without the 
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participants having to perform any movements. To obscure the shift, two blue fields were 
superimposed on the screen, slowly creeping inwards from the sides of the viewed hand until 
the field of view on the screen had shrunk to only include the hand. At this point, the 
participant’s hand had been displaced 8 cm laterally, either actively or passively, and the 
participants were unaware of the displacement.  
In Study III, we compared the change in the perceived hand localization between the active 
and passive conditions. The participants indicated the perceived hand localization as described 
in the proprioceptive drift measure above before and after their hand had been actively or 
passively displaced without their awareness of the displacement. 
3.6 MOVING RUBBER HAND ILLUSION SETUP 
In Study IV, we adopted the moving rubber hand illusion setup for the fMRI environment. In 
particular, the vertical setup of the illusion used in previous studies had to be abandoned for a 
horizontal setup in order to fit inside the scanned bore (Fig. 6, Panel E). Furthermore, the setup 
had to be completely non-ferromagnetic, which called for a replacement of all the metallic 
components in the flexible joints of the hand. To link the movements of the index finger of the 
rubber hand and the index finger of the participant in the horizontal setup, a new mechanical 
linkage using a series of levers and rods was designed (Fig. 6, Panel A). This setup allowed us 
to manipulate the synchrony, movement type (active or passive) and anatomical congruency of 
the rubber hand. By extracting the pin connecting the levers together (Fig. 6, Panel C-D) the 
movements of the rubber hand could be decoupled by from the movements of the participants 
hand (asynchronous condition). The movement type was manipulated by having participants 
move their fingers actively, or have the experimenter move their finger by pressing the rod 
connected to their finger up (Fig. 6, Panel B). The anatomical congruency of the rubber hand 
was manipulated by rotating the rubber hand 180 degrees.  
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Figure 6. Panel A-D illustrates the levers of the moving rubber hand illusion setup under the table that moved the 
index finger of the participant and the rubber hand. In A, the levers are in a relaxed position with the index finger 
of the rubber hand and the participant’s hand resting on the table. In B, both the participants index finger and the 
index finger of the rubber hand is lifted off the table. The two levers are connected to each other through a pin. In 
this configuration the participants could lift their index finger, which would simultaneously lift the index finger of 
the rubber hand (active synchronous conditions), or the experimenter could push the index finger of the participant 
up by pressing on the rod underneath the participants index finger (as seen in the image; passive synchronous 
condition). In C & D, the two fingers have been decoupled by removing the pin holding the two levers together. In 
this configuration, the index finger of the rubber hand and the participants hand could be moved independently 
(active and passive asynchronous conditions). E. Depicts a montage of what the participants would see laying 
inside the MR-scanner. The white semi-opaque field illustrates the dark cloth used to cover the participant’s real 
right hand from sight. The participant’s hand and the rubber hand are seen resting on the small table. The index 
finger of the rubber hand as well as the participant’s hand is placed inside a white plastic ring, which is connected 
to the two most lateral vertical rods seen in panel A-D. 
3.7 FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 
3.7.1 General 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a non-invasive neuroimaging method which 
has gained increased popularity since its discovery in 1990 (Ogawa et al., 1990) and can be 
used to test specific neuroanatomical hypotheses in controlled experiments on healthy human 
volunteers. In contrast to anatomical MRI scans, the principle of fMRI rests on the so-called 
neurovascular reflex originally proposed by Charles Roy and Charles Sherrington who 
discovered that regional changes in blood flow to the brain could be observed in response to 
brain activity (Roy & Sherrington, 1890). In essence, the reflex is based on the notion that as 
neuronal populations in a brain region become activated, their metabolic demand increases. 
This leads to a higher extraction of oxygen from the blood and approximately 0.5 seconds after 
the increase in neuronal activity, the concentration of oxygenated hemoglobin decreases. The 
local decrease in oxygen in turn triggers a vascular reflex leading to dilation of local arterioles, 
which some 4-6s afterwards leads to an over-compensatory increase in the regional blood flow. 
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These changes in the regional blood flow is called the hemodynamic response function (HRF), 
which although it cannot be measured directly, does have measurable proxies in the form of 
different magnetic properties of oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin. These magnetic 
differences can be measured inside the strong magnetic field of the MR-scanner by measuring 
the response to a radio frequency pulse transmitted into the heterogenic magnetic field. The 
resulting signal is called the Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) signal and allows 
the researchers to obtain a snapshot image of the blood flow in a section of the brain. Repeating 
the same procedure over multiple sections throughout the brain generates a three-dimensional 
volume of the whole brain with measured BOLD signals in three-dimensional pixels, so-called 
voxels. Modern MR-scanners can sample one volume of the whole brain every couple of 
seconds, and by continuously sampling whole brain volumes, the change in the BOLD signal 
of brain regions can be analyzed over time, albeit with a temporal resolution of a couple of 
seconds. The BOLD signal, although being an indirect measure of the regional blood flow 
which in turn is an indirect measure of neuronal activity, has been shown to be a reliable 
measure of brain activity which correlates with changes in the cerebral blood flow and blood 
volume (Goense et al., 2012) as well as with the local field potential (Logothetis et al., 2001).  
3.7.2 Limitations 
fMRI has provided cognitive neuroscientist, neuropsychiatrists and psychologists with a 
powerful tool to investigate neural activity related to cognitive tasks and pathology. However, 
there are some drawbacks with the method that warrants caution and careful planning of 
experiments. First of all, the temporal resolution in fMRI is relatively low compared to other 
neurophysiological measures (for instance EEG or ECoG) and the activity in the brain is 
sampled every couple of seconds, meaning that the experimental conditions need to be long 
enough to be able register the change in BOLD signal and be spaced with sufficient time 
between each condition to avoid carry-over effects. In Study IV we therefore used a blocked 
design, where each condition is repeated within a block for tens of seconds and followed by a 
break before the next condition. Blocked designs have been shown to increase the statistical 
power of the fMRI data analysis (Friston et al., 1999), while facilitating the design and analysis. 
Moreover, the data collection in fMRI requires the participants to be completely still, since the 
volumes of the brain containing the voxels of brain activity assumes that the voxels are static 
and that the same volume of brain tissue is sampled at every timepoint. To ensure that the 
participants did not move during the experiment, the participants were instructed to not move 
their head during the experiment and we also made sure that the participant’s head was fixed 
inside the head coil of the MR-scanner by placing padding and foam pads around the 
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participant’s head inside the head coil. Apart from these practical efforts to reduce head motion 
during the experiment, the software used to analyze the fMRI data (Statistical Parametric 
Modelling 12, SPM12, Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging, University College London, 
UK) has an algorithm that corrects for motion during the preprocessing steps of the data 
analysis. The algorithm exports the realignment parameters which allowed us to inspect the 
head motion for every participant and in every run. We could not identify any head motion that 
was larger than the size of one voxel (2 mm) in our fMRI protocol in Study IV, and thus we 
did not exclude any volumes from the analysis.  
Despite the clear advantages of the blocked fMRI design in regard to our experimental setup, 
there are some potential caveats. Since the experimental conditions are designed as blocks of 
repeated stimuli, the condition regressors entered into the analysis do not take into account 
variances in number or frequency of stimuli between conditions. Hence, the number and 
frequency of stimuli need to be carefully controlled across conditions to avoid that the results 
are confounded by such differences. In Study IV, participants made self-paced tapping 
movements with their right index finger; in order to control for the number and frequency of 
taps, participants were instructed to be consistent with the frequency of taps and were also 
trained with a metronome (1Hz) prior to starting the data collection. Moreover, we made use 
of an optical sensor placed under the index finger of the participant that could register whenever 
the participants lifted their finger off the table, and thus we could get a measure of the number 
and frequency of taps. We show that there are no significant differences in neither the number 
or the frequency of taps across conditions, and therefore feel comfortable that the results 
obtained are not driven by differences in the number of stimuli between conditions (Fig. 7).   
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Figure 7. To control for the number and frequency of taps across conditions we used an optical sensor to register 
the finger movements of the participants. A Shows the average number of taps during the entire experiments for 
each condition. In B, we show the frequency of taps split up by condition and time before illusion onset. In C, the 
individual taps from one participant (no 17) is shown, with the data from the optical sensor indicating when the 
participant’s finger is lifted off the table (‘Finger off’) and when it is placed on the table (‘Finger on’).  
In Study IV, we employed a within-subjects 2x2x2 factorial design. We defined the factors 
synchrony (synchronous or asynchronous), movement type (active or passive) and anatomical 
congruency (congruent or incongruent) generating eight unique conditions. The benefit of this 
factorial design is that we can define specific contrasts as interactions between the factors with 
precise and efficient control conditions. The benefits of having proper control conditions by 
opting for this type of factorial design has to be weighed against the cost of having eight unique 
conditions, which includes prolonged scan time and increased complexity in the 
comprehension of the results. In the end, we opted to run the experiment using the 2x2x2 
design, due to the fact that we were interested in the three-way interaction between synchrony, 
movement type and anatomical congruency, and we reasoned we had a robust plan for the 
analysis a priori.  
3.7.3 Preprocessing 
Prior to the statistical analysis, the fMRI data from all participants were subject to standard 
preprocessing steps. In Study IV, the participants lay inside the MR-scanner with their head 
tilted, therefore, the collected images had to be manually rotated back to a standard position. 
Following this, the standard preprocessing steps including motion correction, slice timing 
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correction, co-registration, re-slicing, normalization and smoothing was carried out on all 
functional images. The functional images were normalized to a standard Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) brain, which allowed us to compare results between participants as well as 
compare our results with the previous literature using the same standardized MNI space. The 
images were resliced to a resolution of 2x2x2 mm and the smoothing was done using a 6 mm 
FWHM Gaussian kernel.  
3.7.4 Univariate analyses 
In the first-level analysis in Study IV, we defined regressors for each condition individually 
for every participant and run. The periods before illusion onset (using individually obtained 
time-to-illusion measurements) were modeled as regressors of no interest. Each experimental 
condition was modeled with a boxcar function and convolved with the hemodynamic response 
function in SPM12. Linear contrasts were defined at the individual level and then exported to 
the second-level random effects analysis.  
3.7.5 The problem of multiple comparisons in fMRI 
Statistical analysis of fMRI poses a challenge due to the large amount of data collected. Each 
participant can generate up to millions of data points which are entered into the statistical 
analysis, which makes inferences hard, and increases the risk of false positive results. Due to 
this, several different approaches to increase the statistical power while minimizing the risk of 
type 1 errors have been developed. In Study IV, we used a combination of two approaches. 
First, we looked for activity on the whole brain level, correcting for multiple comparisons using 
the more lenient so-called false discovery rate (FDR). Furthermore, based on the previous 
literature, we had anatomical hypotheses regarding certain brain regions, but due to differences 
in the experimental setup between our current study and the literature, we also conducted a 
pilot study with similar experimental manipulations as in Study IV and extracted the precise 
coordinates for the activation peaks within those brain regions. We then conducted analyses 
where we corrected for multiple comparisons using the more conservative family-wise error 
correction, (FWE) within a defined volume of space centered on those activation peaks. Some 
activations, that did not survive the whole-brain FDR correction, nor had any corresponding 
anatomical hypotheses that would warrant small volume FWE correction, we report for 
descriptive purposes only, and always indicate that they did not reach statistical significance 
after correction for multiple comparisons.  
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4 MAIN RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this section, I will briefly summarize the main results and conclusions from each study. For 
detailed results and an extended discussion, I refer the reader to the manuscripts attached at the 
end of this thesis.  
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4.1 STUDY I 
 
Figure 8. The main methods and findings from Study I. A depicts the experimental setup. The rubber hand was 
placed on top of a small table under which the participants hand rested on the hand displacement apparatus. B In 
experiment 1 we showed that the sense of body ownership expressed as the illusion index (ownership ratings minus 
ownership control ratings) did not differ regardless of whether the spatial discrepancy between the participants 
real hand and the rubber hand had increased or decreased. In experiment 2, we replicate the findings for the 
condition in which the discrepancy increases and show that there is no difference between this and a static 
condition in which the participants hand was not moved at all. Note that the displacement of the participants hand 
was done without them noticing the displacement, but the change in location of their displaced hand is apparent 
in the hand localization task used to calculate the proprioceptive drift. Drifts >0 indicate a change in hand 
localization toward the rubber hand, whereas drifts <0 indicate a change in hand localization away from the 
rubber hand. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.  
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The goal of Study I was to investigate the causal relationship between changes in perceived 
limb location and the subjective sense of body ownership. Some neurocognitive models of 
body ownership had suggested that recalibration of hand position sense towards the rubber 
hand was a pre-requisite for the illusion to develop (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), whereas others 
placed emphasis on the visuo-tactile integration in peri-personal space which would in turn 
lead to a recalibration of hand position sense (Makin et al., 2008). To this end, we designed 
experimental conditions in which a change in perceived limb location could be induced without 
the participant noticing. We show that the illusion strength remains unaffected by relatively 
large changes in perceived hand location towards or away from the rubber hand (Fig. 8). These 
results indicate that the sense of body ownership of the rubber hand is not reliant on displaying 
a proprioceptive drift towards the rubber hand, and furthermore indicates that the 
proprioceptive drift should not be used as a proxy of the illusion by itself. However, these 
results also reproduce the previously reported difference between proprioceptive drift in the 
synchronous and asynchronous condition (the proprioceptive shift) for the static condition, 
indicating the rubber hand illusion and the proprioceptive drift are somehow correlated, albeit 
not at a causal level directed from proprioceptive drift to the subjective illusion. Our results do 
not rule out the possibility that the causal relationship is directed in the opposite direction, 
namely that sense of body ownership over the rubber hand induces changes in perceived hand 
location. This notion is compatible with existing neurocognitive models of body ownership 
(Makin et al., 2008), as well as recent computational models of body ownership based on 
Bayesian causal inference as outlined in the introduction (Samad et al., 2015). 
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4.2 STUDY II 
 
Figure 9. The main methods from Study II. A depicts the experimenter inducing the rubber hand illusion on a 
subject by applying brush strokes to the participant’s hand and the rubber hand. The metallic rod with the ruler 
marks used in the hand localization task for the proprioceptive drift is seen placed across the wrists of the 
participant’s hand and the rubber hand but could easily be moved up to be placed across the fingertips right before 
the hand localization task. B is a schematic overview of the two experiments in Study II. The main difference 
between experiment 1 and 2 is the amount of time the participants had their eyes open and viewed the rubber hand.  
In Study II, we examined the persistence of the subjective illusion and the proprioceptive drift 
in the rubber hand illusion after the end of the visuo-tactile stimulation. In two experiments, 
we induce the classic rubber hand illusion for 60 seconds, and then stop the visuo-tactile 
stimulation. Subsequently, we measure the proprioceptive drift as well as subjective ratings of 
the illusions at several time points after the end of the visuo-tactile stimulation (Fig. 9). We 
show that both the proprioceptive drift and the subjective illusion persist for tens of seconds 
after the end of the visuo-tactile stimulation (Fig. 10, Panel A). Furthermore, we analyzed the 
slopes of the decay curves in the synchronous condition for both the subjective illusion and the 
proprioceptive drift which revealed strikingly similar decay curves (Fig. 10, Panel B). Finally, 
we show that the decay is unaffected by whether the participants have their eyes open, looking 
at the rubber hand or whether they have their eyes closed (comparison between experiment 1 
& 2, Fig. 10, Panel C). Taken together our results indicate that the proprioceptive drift and the 
subjective illusion is highly correlated with regard to their decay after the end of the visuo-
tactile stimulation, suggestive of a causal relationship between the two phenomena.   
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Figure 10. The main findings from Study II. A depicts the rating of the ownership statement and proprioceptive 
drift in the synchronous and asynchronous condition in experiment 1 & 2. In B, the slopes for the curves of the 
synchronous condition was calculated for each time period between two measuring points in experiment 1 & 2. 
There were no differences between the slopes of the subjective illusion rating or the proprioceptive drift in neither 
of the experiments. C shows the interaction between synchrony and experiment (1 or 2). The analysis only showed 
a significant difference at the 300 second time point for the subjective illusion rating with higher ratings in 
experiment 1 compared to experiment 2. *p<0.05. 
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4.3 STUDY III 
 
Figure 11. The main methods and findings from Study III. A depicts the experimental setup. The participants hand 
was placed inside the hand illusion box. The participant viewed their hand from the first-person perspective inside 
the box. B The results showed that active unaware displacement of the participants hand caused a larger 
recalibration of hand position sense toward the visual position of the hand compared to passive unaware 
displacement. Note that the displacement of the participants hand was done without them noticing the 
displacement. 0 indicates the perceived position of the hand prior to the displacement, as well as the visual position 
of the hand throughout the trials. **p<0.01. 
Study III aimed at comparing the visuo-proprioceptive adaptation during unconscious active 
and passive movements. We knew from the literature on prism adaptation and motor control 
that active movements lead to a faster and stronger recalibration of visual and proprioceptive 
maps (Beckett, 1980; Fernández-Ruiz et al., 2004; Hein & Held, 1958; Mikaelian & Held, 
1964; Welch et al., 1979). However, it was unclear whether this recalibration is based on 1) 
conscious motor intentions or motor awareness and 2) salient error signals due to either 
sensorimotor or visuo-proprioceptive mismatches. In Study I, we had shown that participants 
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were surprisingly accurate in locating the position of their hand after it had been passively 
displaced without their awareness, and thus we were curious as to whether they would be less 
accurate if their hand had been displaced actively without their awareness. In Study III, we 
show that the same pattern of results is present with unconscious active and passive 
movements, where active displacement leads to a larger recalibration of perceived hand 
location towards the viewed position of the hand than passive displacement (Fig. 11). No such 
difference is seen in the static control conditions where there were no digital shift of the viewed 
hand and hence no displacement of the participant’s hand, indicating that the recalibration 
cannot be attributed to general differences in the accuracy between the active and passive 
condition. We hence conclude that neither motor awareness, nor salient error signals is 
necessary for the increase in visuo-proprioceptive recalibration that is seen in active 
movements compared to passive movements, suggestive of an unconscious efference copy-
based mechanism underlying the increased recalibration seen in the active conditions.  
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4.4 STUDY IV 
In Study IV, we investigated the neural correlates of the sense of body ownership and agency, 
as well as their interaction. We employed a 2x2x2 factorial design to manipulate the sense of 
body ownership and agency independently (Fig. 12). Our results demonstrate that the sense of 
body ownership is associated with activity in the pre-central gyrus, the supra marginal gyrus 
and the cerebellum (Fig. 13). Our findings replicate previous studies that have identified 
frontal, parietal and cerebellar regions associated with the sense of body ownership (H Henrik 
Ehrsson et al., 2004; Gentile et al., 2013; Guterstam et al., 2013; Petkova et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, we also find a correlation between behavioral measures and parameter estimates 
for the activation in the precentral gyrus (PMd). 
 
 
Figure 12. In A, a schematic illustration of the design matrix for the 2x2x2 design used in Study IV is shown. The 
conditions are color coded with the same colors used in the figures related to Study IV. In B, all the eight unique 
conditions as well as their acronyms and colors used in the figures related to Study IV are shown.   
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Figure 13. A. Overview of the brain regions that display activation reflecting the sense of body ownership over 
the rubber hand. For display purposes only, the activations are projected on to a three-dimensional render of a 
standard brain with at a threshold of p<0.005 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons). LH, left hemisphere. Occ, 
occipital view. CS, central sulcus. B. Bar charts displaying the parameter estimates and SEs for the major peaks 
of activation, as well as one scatter plot of the correlation between parameter estimates and subjective illusion 
ratings for one activation peak in the pre-central gyrus (PMd). The coordinates are given in MNI space. The peaks 
are displayed in representative sections indicated by a dotted white circle on an activation map (p<0.005 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons). L/R, left/right. PrCG, precentral gyrus. SMG, supramarginal gyrus. 
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Furthermore, we identified the right superior temporal gyrus (STG), and the left PMd to be the 
brain regions that display activity associated with the sense of agency (Fig. 14). The PMd is 
anatomically connected to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the PPC and is thus in 
an excellent position to integrate information regarding motor intentions from the DLPFC and 
information regarding the state of the body from the multisensory PPC.  
 
 
Figure 14. A. Overview of the brain regions that display activation reflecting the sense of agency. For display 
purposes only, the activations are projected on to a three-dimensional render of a standard brain with at a 
threshold of p<0.005 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons). RH/LH, right/left hemisphere. STS, superior 
temporal sulcus. CS, central sulcus. B. Bar charts displaying the parameter estimates and SEs for the major peaks 
of activation. The coordinates are given in MNI space. The peaks are displayed in representative sections indicated 
by a dotted white circle on an activation map (p<0.005 uncorrected for multiple comparisons). L/R, left/right. 
STG, superior temporal gyrus. PrCG, precentral gyrus.  
We then analyzed the interaction between the sense of body ownership and the sense of agency. 
We conducted a within subjects, three-way interaction analysis including the factors synchrony 
(synchronous or asynchronous), movement type (active or passive) and congruency (congruent 
or incongruent). Our results show that the left post-central gyrus and left primary sensory cortex 
displays increased activation when experiencing agency over bodily objects compared to 
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external objects (Fig. 15). These areas have been implicated in a meta-analysis to be activated 
during self-attribution of the sense of agency (Sperduti et al., 2011).  
 
 
Figure 15. A. Overview of the brain regions that display activation reflecting increased activation related to 
agency of bodily objects compared to external objects. For display purposes only, the activations are projected on 
to a three-dimensional render of a standard brain with at a threshold of p<0.005 (uncorrected for multiple 
comparisons). RH/LH, right/left hemisphere. IPS, intraparietal sulcus. PoCS, post-central sulcus. CS, central 
sulcus B. Bar charts displaying the parameter estimates and SEs for the major peaks of activation. The coordinates 
are given in MNI space. The peaks are displayed in representative sections indicated by a dotted white circle on 
an activation map (p<0.005 uncorrected for multiple comparisons). L/R, left/right. PoCG, post-central gyrus. * 
indicates activation peaks that do not survive the small volume correction. 
To analyze which brain regions that display increased activity during experience of agency 
over external objects compared to bodily objects, we defined a contrast that was the inverse of 
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the three-way interaction for bodily agency. The analysis revealed that the left visual 
association cortex was more active during the experience of agency of external objects 
compared to the experience of agency of bodily objects (Fig. 16). 
 
 
Figure 16. The brain regions that display increased activity associated with agency of external objects compared 
to agency of bodily objects defined as a contrast that was the inverse of the three-way interaction used in figure 
15. The results show activation in the left medial occipital gyrus. The coordinates are given in MNI space. The 
peak is displayed in a representative section and indicated by a dotted white circle on an activation map (p<0.005 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons). 
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5 DISCUSSION 
This thesis aimed at investigating the perceptual and neural mechanisms of body ownership, in 
particular its relation to voluntary action and processes underpinning the sense of agency. We 
use different bodily illusions and sensorimotor illusions to manipulate certain aspects of the 
sense of body ownership, agency or voluntary action in a precise and predictable way. The 
experiments in this thesis characterized the perceptual and neural mechanism of these 
manipulations of body ownership and agency and show that the results are consistent with 
multisensory and motor-sensory computational models of these phenomena, respectively. In 
Study I we challenge the notion that a change in hand position sense towards the rubber hand 
is a prerequisite for the experience of ownership of the rubber hand. We show that the 
subjective experience of ownership is unaffected by mechanically induced changes in hand 
position sense, even when directed away from the rubber hand. In Study II, we characterize 
the temporal relationship between the subjective experience of ownership and the visuo-
proprioceptive recalibration of hand position sense, in particular we show that the subjective 
experience of ownership as well as the recalibration of hand position persist for tens of seconds 
after the end of the visuo-tactile stimulation. Furthermore, the temporal dynamics of the decay 
of these two measures are strikingly similar. In Study III, we investigate the visuo-
proprioceptive recalibration of hand position sense in relation to voluntary action. In particular, 
we investigate whether visuo-proprioceptive recalibration of hand position sense is affected by 
unconscious voluntary action. We show that unconscious active movements lead to greater 
recalibration compared to unconscious passive movements. In Study IV, we examine the 
neural correlates of the sense of body ownership and agency, and the interaction between these 
two experiences. We show that the sense of body ownership and the sense of agency can be 
behaviorally dissociated, and furthermore, we show that they have distinct neural correlates, 
consistent with the notion of them being two separate processes.  
5.1 THE SENSE OF BODY OWNERSHIP – INFERRING AND INTEGRATING 
How is the sense of body ownership brought about, and what governs the visuo-proprioceptive 
recalibration seen the rubber hand illusion? Our results from Study I and Study II demonstrate 
two things: first of all, in Study I we show that the subjective experience of body ownership 
can happen independent of the recalibration of hand position sense towards the rubber hand. 
This result is consistent with the recent causal inference model of body ownership which states 
that an inference to a common cause happens first, followed by an integration the multisensory 
signals (Samad et al., 2015). Such a notion makes teleological sense, otherwise we would be 
recalibrating our visuo-proprioceptive system to the sight of other people’s limbs over which 
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we do not experience any sense of body ownership. Second, in Study II we show that once a 
sense of body ownership and visuo-proprioceptive recalibration of hand position has been 
established in the rubber hand illusion, they persist for tens of seconds after the end of the 
visuo-tactile stimulation and seem to display striking similarities with regards to the speed and 
dynamics of their decay, suggestive of a causal relationship between the two phenomena. To 
interpret the results from Study II within the same causal inference framework requires some 
adaptation of the model since the causal inference model only has been empirically validated 
for the integration of multisensory stimuli, while in Study II, we investigate the segregation of 
multisensory stimuli. Applying the same model, somewhat speculatively, one could assume 
that during the illusion, the prior probability that the rubber hand is one’s own has been updated 
after the inference to a common cause has been made. Once the visuo-tactile stimulation stops, 
the now integrated stimuli will start to be segregated, and the inference to a common cause 
transforms to inference to separate causes. However, with this model, one might rightfully ask 
why there is a segregation at all, could the illusion not be maintained indefinitely as long as no 
new contradicting sensory information is presented? One could speculate that the spontaneous 
decay of the illusion and the proprioceptive drift happens due to either or a combination of (i) 
the possibility that the prior probability indicating that the rubber hand is one’s own hand is 
weaker than the “native” prior of the rubber hand not being one’s own hand, which might 
require constant sensory information in support of its maintenance or (ii) the small visuo-
proprioceptive mismatch might gradually, over time build up sensory information in opposition 
of the unified inference, ultimately leading to its segregation. However, the precise causal and 
temporal between the subjective experience of body ownership and the recalibration of hand 
position sense needs to be studied further in detail, in particular their relationship during the 
induction of the illusion. 
In Study IV, we show that the sense of body ownership is associated with activity in know 
multisensory areas in frontal, parietal and cerebellar regions. It is worth noting that the peaks 
we observe in our experiment are not completely overlapping with the peaks found in previous 
papers (H Henrik Ehrsson et al., 2004; Gentile et al., 2013, 2015; Guterstam et al., 2013). We 
interpret this slight difference to be due to the differences in the level of motor activity and the 
type of multisensory integration between the types of bodily illusions. In the moving rubber 
hand illusion, as opposed to the classic rubber hand illusion induced by synchronous 
brushstrokes, the participants perform active movements, and the synchronous multisensory 
signals to be integrated are mainly visuo-kinesthetic (i.e., proprioceptive signals from the finger 
flexing and visual signals from the moving rubber hand’s finger, although tactile stimuli from 
the skin covering the joints is also present). These differences could lead to differences in the 
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exact localization of the activation peaks, and for this reason, we performed the localizer 
experiments described in the methods to identify the exact activation peaks within the regions 
of interest in our experiment. Of particular interest is the activity in the PMd, which we show 
to correlate with subjective measures of ownership, replicating the findings from previous body 
illusion studies which have found similar correlations in the PMv (H Henrik Ehrsson et al., 
2004; Guterstam et al., 2013). Apart from the known multisensory neuronal populations in the 
premotor cortex (Fogassi et al., 1996; M. S. Graziano et al., 1997; M. S. A. Graziano & Gross, 
1998), and the fact that it has strong anatomical connections to other multisensory areas in the 
parietal lobe as well as to the primary motor cortex (Dum et al., 2002; Porter & Lemon, 1995), 
the premotor cortex has in a recent body illusion study on macaques been shown to integrate 
multisensory stimuli in a Bayes-optimal way (Fang et al., 2019), further implicating its role in 
the multisensory mechanisms involved in generating a sense of body ownership. Taken 
together, one could theoretically speculate that the bodily representation is grounded in a 
parieto-frontal network, where the premotor cortex infers whether the sensory signals from 
multisensory parietal regions share a common cause, which in turn updates the priors of these 
multisensory signals thus designating the degree of integration. 
In light of these findings, one might speculate what the potential benefits of having a system 
dedicated to assigning ownership of bodies and limbs are? This system, which is highly 
efficient at identifying and self-attributing body parts to one’s self has been proposed to have 
evolved from the more basic need to segregate one’s own body from the outside world 
(Frédérique de Vignemont, 2015; Guterstam, 2016). The multisensory integration within peri-
personal space leading to the ability to distinguish bodily from non-bodily objects was likely 
accompanied by the advantage of being able to protect one’s body from physical harm more 
efficiently (Dijkerman & Farnè, 2015), a notion that is also consistent with other reductionistic 
ideas that grounds the sense of body ownership in an affective experience of one’s own body 
(Frédérique de Vignemont, 2015). Such theories have been proposed in both the philosophical 
and neuroscientific literature (Frédérique de Vignemont, 2015; Guterstam, 2016), and has been 
particularly outlined in the bodyguard hypothesis of the sense of ownership (F de Vignemont, 
2017). It is interesting to speculate on the ubiquity of such a system, since much of the 
knowledge of the multisensory mechanisms comes from electrophysiological studies on non-
human primates, indicating that they possess the necessary infrastructure for such a system. 
However, since they cannot explicitly communicate their subjective experiences it is difficult 
to infer whether the neuronal activity is also accompanied by any subjective experiences of 
ownership. With that said, recent studies employing different proxy measures of the sense of 
body ownership have demonstrated some kind of bodily illusion in non-human primates (Fang 
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et al., 2019; Shokur et al., 2013) as well as rats (Wada et al., 2016), indicating that at least some 
of the processes underlying the bodily illusion seem to be conserved across species.  
5.2 THE SENSE OF AGENCY – PREDICTING AND COMPARING 
As outlined in the introduction, the sense of agency has been reported to consist of different 
components with different temporal relationship to the action and subsequent sensory 
feedback. The prospective component of agency is thought to arise prior to the effect of the 
action has been registered, whereas the retrospective component of agency arises after the 
action and its sensory effects have been registered. Converging evidence support the notion 
that retrospective comparisons between sensory predictions and reafferent signals is the 
dominant process through which a subjective sense of agency is elicited (David et al., 2008; 
Haggard, 2017; Synofzik et al., 2008). However, the judgement of agency also seems to be 
influenced by a prospective component of agency, which has been shown to be related to the 
causal contingencies of the action and outcome, with a higher impact of the prospective 
component on the sense of agency seen in conditions with high causal contingencies (A. Sato, 
2009). These results fit well with a recent Bayesian framework that applies weights to the 
various sources of information (i.e., priors and sensory signals) based on their relative 
reliability (Legaspi & Toyoizumi, 2019; Wolpe et al., 2013; Lau et al., 2007). This would mean 
that when predictability of the sensory consequences of an action is high, the actual sensory 
feedback receives a lower weighting than when the predictability is low. This has been shown 
for the  implicit intentional binding measure as well as explicit judgements of the sense of 
agency; if the reliability of the sensory feedback is reduced by the introduction of noise, there’s 
less shift in the perceived action timing towards the feedback (Wolpe et al., 2013), and 
furthermore, if the predictability of an outcome is high, there is a larger shift in perceived action 
timing towards the feedback, and participants also report a higher sense of subjective agency 
(A. Sato, 2009).  
In this thesis, I propose that this distinction between the prospective components of agency and 
the retrospective components of agency is relevant for agency in a bodily context. I base this 
proposition on the empirical evidence suggesting that the prospective components are 
dependent on the predictability of actions, i.e., the causal contingencies, whereas the 
retrospective component is dependent on a post-hoc comparison between intended and actual 
sensory feedback. Since the physical body is an object through which we’ve interact with the 
world our whole lives, the a priori causal contingencies are high, and thus the predictability of 
the action outcomes is high, meaning that the prospective predictions can be weighted higher 
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in the process of agency attribution. Whereas for the sense of agency of external objects and 
events, new causal contingencies need to be collected and validated, and hence, the sense of 
agency will (at least initially) be more dependent upon a retrospective matching between 
predicted and actual sensory feedback. Until recently, separating the bodily related sensory 
feedback of an action from the external sensory feedback was difficult since all actions will 
generate some kind of sensory feedback from the body. However, by using the moving rubber 
hand illusion, the sense of body ownership and agency can be transferred onto the rubber hand, 
and furthermore, this can be manipulated. By placing the hand in an anatomically congruent 
position while the participants control the rubber hand actively will induce a sense of ownership 
as well as a sense of agency, and hence the sensory feedback from the participants hand as well 
as the rubber hand will both be mapped onto the same body part, which is perceived as one’s 
own. By rotating the rubber hand 180 degrees, the rubber hand and the participant’s hand will 
be perceived as two separate objects, and hence, the sensory feedback from the rubber hand 
and from the participant’s hand will be segregated, in essence leading to the visual feedback 
from the rubber hand being segregated from the tactile and proprioceptive feedback from the 
participants hand (Fig. 17, right panel). This will lead to the proprioceptive and tactile 
(kinesthetic) signals to be highly predictable since they are interpreted arising from the own 
body, whilst the visual signals are less predictable and thus the actual visual sensory feedback 
receives a higher weighting (Fig. 17, right panel). This dissociation is the basis for the 
comparison between agency of bodily objects and non-bodily objects and events.  I propose 
that agency of bodily objects is more reliant on the prospective, causality dependent component 
of agency, while agency of external objects is more reliant on retrospective comparison of the 
actual sensory feedback and the predicted sensory feedback. The neuroimaging results from 
Study IV implicates the primary somatosensory area to be the brain region related to the bodily 
agency, likely representing the predictions regarding sensory feedback from the own body 
(Shergill et al., 2014). Conversely, we show that agency of external objects is associated with 
increased activity in visual areas, consistent with the proposed model (Fig. 17). Further 
analyses of Study IV should investigate whether there is any increase in effective connectivity 
between the left PMd (which was associated with the sense of agency regardless of whether it 
was of bodily or external objects) and primary sensory cortex or visual association cortex for 
the different types of agency.  
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Figure 17. In the left panel, agency of bodily objects is illustrated. The visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals 
are all interpreted as arising from the own body, and hence they are highly predicted by the forward model (F.M.). 
The right panel shows the sense of agency of non-bodily objects. The visual feedback is now segregated from the 
tactile and proprioceptive, and hence is not predicted to the same extent since it is not perceived as arising from 
the own body. The weighting is thus more reliant on the retrospective component, due to the lower predictability 
of the visual feedback. The green field represents the processes that happen before the action, and thus represent 
the prospective component of agency, whereas the grey field indicate the processes after action execution, thus 
representing the retrospective component of agency. The “priors” in the causal inference model of agency is thus 
contained within the green field, since they represent the prospective components of agency. 
One might wonder why the brain would possess two separate mechanisms for attributing 
agency. I do not think the prospective component of agency is specific for agency of bodily 
actions, rather I think there are general advantages of having two mechanisms that can be 
applied to all actions and outcomes. As described in the proposed Bayesian model of agency, 
the attribution of agency depends on a joint weighting of the prior probability as well as the 
sensory feedback. Having a system that depends on both the priors and the post-hoc sensory 
feedback means that the system is dually protected against being limited in situations of 
uncertain or noisy sensory feedback, for instance, when moving our limbs in the dark without 
visual feedback, we can still experience a sense of agency over our actions. At the same time, 
being able to rely more heavily on the sensory feedback in cases of weak priors makes us learn 
new causal associations to our actions and thus over time build causal structures that underlie 
future predictions. Alone, neither the prospective component nor the retrospective component 
seems to be sufficient, only relying on the predictions of the prospective component can lead 
to gross miscalculations (since the predictions can be faulty), whereas only relying on the 
retrospective component seem to run the risk of misclassifying events as self-caused when they 
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are not, which has been proposed to be the case for schizophrenic patients (S. J. Blakemore et 
al., 2000; Shergill et al., 2005, 2014). 
Furthermore, it is also interesting to consider the potential benefits of having a sense of agency 
at all. I speculate that the sense of agency developed from a more basic sensory filtration 
system, aimed at being able to distinguish self-generated sensory signals from externally 
generated sensory signals by modulating the saliency of the afferent signals (Crapse & 
Sommer, 2008; Kilteni et al., 2019; Maimon et al., 2010; Polack et al., 2013; J. F. A. Poulet & 
Hedwig, 2006; Schneider et al., 2014; Shergill et al., 2003). Such a system is relevant not only 
for the protection of one’s body from physical harm, by for instance increasing the saliency of 
a predator’s sound, but also for communication and social interactions within populations. 
Interestingly, various sensory modulatory effects based on the principle of corollary discharge 
(equivalent to the efference copy) have been observed in across the animal kingdom (Crapse 
& Sommer, 2008). One of the most striking examples can be found in crickets, where self-
generated chirps are accompanied by an inhibition of auditory neurons, indicating that it is a 
preserved basic mechanism for sensory predictions (J. f. a. Poulet & Hedwig, 2003). Once such 
a system was in place and able to distinguish self from externally generated sensory signals, it 
could have been adopted to also infer a sense of agency according to the neural recycling 
hypothesis (Dehaene & Cohen, 2007). The benefits of not only predicting and suppressing the 
self-generated reafferent sensory signals, but also self-attributing the causality of the generated 
sensory signals to one’s self is that it could lead to improvements of the predictions. Without 
such self-attributing, faulty predictions would lead to just repeatedly interpreting the sensory 
signals as external.  Interestingly, speculating in such a neural recycling hypothesis predicts a 
prospective component to the sense of agency, since the sensory filtration mechanisms need to 
be deployed prior to receiving the sensory feedback, one piece of the puzzle which was missing 
from the comparator model.  
5.3 OWNERSHIP AND AGENCY – PROTECTING AND GUIDING 
In line with my proposition above, I do not propose that there is anything special regarding the 
sense of agency of bodily objects aside from their inherent familiarity and the high 
predictability of the reafferent sensory signals that bodily actions produce. One interesting 
prediction that can be derived from this notion is that given the same amount of training, non-
bodily objects should enjoy the same amount of predictability and hence, display the same 
pattern of results. This is a testable hypothesis, wherein participants could for instance receive 
a tool or some other manipulandum to use frequently enough for their forward models to 
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become more precise and efficient at predicting the sensory outcomes. This could be compared 
to the use of tools that have not been trained to the same extent. Recent studies on tool use have 
shown that the recalibration of peri-personal space around the hand can happen after a relatively 
short period of tool use (Canzoneri et al., 2013; Farnè & Làdavas, 2000; Guterstam et al., 2018; 
Holmes, 2012; Holmes et al., 2007), indicating that there is a plasticity in the system that can 
cater to such recalibrations. 
In the recently proposed Bayesian causal inference model for the sense of agency, the authors 
propose that a sense of agency can arise for unintended actions if the sensory signals are reliable 
enough (Legaspi & Toyoizumi, 2019). The authors do not discuss whether the opposite is 
possible, i.e., given strong enough priors, would it be possible to experience a sense of agency 
without any sensory feedback? The predictions regarding the macroscopic movements of our 
bodies are likely the most robust, and hence would it be possible to experience a sense of 
agency of one’s body without any movement or sensory feedback? Anecdotally, subjective 
reports from participants experiencing the classical (afferent) rubber hand illusion indicated 
that they perceived that if they were to move their finger, the rubber hand would move in the 
same manner, but once they performed the movement and noticed that the rubber hand 
remained static, the illusion broke down. Similarly, when looking at our hands, we can 
experience an implicit sense that if we were to decide to move the hand, the hand would 
comply. These sensations cannot be attributed to a retrospective comparison between predicted 
and reafferent sensory signals, and thus has to be attributed to a prospective component of 
agency. Such prospective accounts of agency judgements have yet to be investigated, and the 
questionnaires used in the body illusion studies on the sense of agency generally fail at 
capturing this sensation since they are usually anchored to the performance of an action.  
Finally, one might ask to what goal the sense of ownership and the sense of agency collaborate? 
I propose that the most likely advantage of both processes is the protection of the physical body 
from harm and the improvement of goal-directed movements. In essence, both the sense of 
body ownership and the sense of agency has the ability to separate one’s self from the 
environment, with regards to what belongs to one’s self and to what was caused by one’s self, 
respectively. The self-attribution of the physical body leads to better sensory predictions and 
the self-attribution of actions leads to fine-tuning of the forward models which gives rise to 
more efficient actions. In Study IV of this thesis, the PMd was identified as the brain region 
that is activated in both these processes, the self-attribution of limbs and the self-attribution of 
actions. One could thus hypothesize that the sense of owning a body and the sense of 
controlling it both converge on to PMd, which with its dense anatomical connections to the 
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primary motor cortex serves as an excellent candidate to guide goal directed actions (Dum et 
al., 2002; Porter & Lemon, 1995).  
5.4 RELEVANCE FOR CLINICAL POPULATIONS 
This thesis investigated the behavioral and neural correlates of the sense of body ownership 
and agency with results that are relevant for research in both clinical and applied neuroscience. 
In particular, the findings from the Studies I-IV are relevant for research on neuroprosthetics, 
where the development of prosthetics that the patients both experience a sense of ownership 
and agency over would vastly improve the quality of life for those patients. Previous research 
has shown that amputees can experience a sense of ownership of robotic hands when receiving 
synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation from the robotic hand and their real hand (H Henrik 
Ehrsson et al., 2008; Rosén et al., 2009). Furthermore, controlling a robotic hand with 
electromyographically (EMG) measured muscular activity has been shown to induce a sense 
of agency of the robotic hand (Marasco et al., 2018; Y. Sato et al., 2018). However, these 
studies all employed peripheral somatosensory stimulation or muscular activity as the means 
to generate the sense of ownership and/or agency, an approach that is not always possible and 
still requires continuous stimulation for the maintenance of the illusory experiences. Until 
recently, it was unclear whether direct electrical stimulation of the cortex could be integrated 
with other sensory modalities to produce the sense of body ownership in a body illusion setup. 
In a recent study, Collins and colleagues showed that electrical stimulation of the primary 
sensory cortex combined with visual stimuli of a rubber hand in the rubber hand illusion could 
generate a sense of ownership of the rubber hand (Collins et al., 2017). This finding paves the 
way for future brain-computer interfaces that directly stimulate the brain regions involved in 
producing these sensory experiences, hopefully leading to improved prosthetics that feel like 
real limbs. To this end, the studies in this thesis which characterized some of the perceptual 
processes and neural correlates of the sense of ownership and agency can provide valuable 
insights; in Study IV, we elucidate the neuroanatomical correlates of the sense of body 
ownership and agency as well as their interaction, which can serve as future target regions for 
these kind of interventions. Furthermore,  in Study II, we show that the sense of ownership as 
well as the recalibration of hand position sense that underlies the proprioceptive drift is 
maintained for tens of seconds after the end of the visuotactile stimulation, indicating that 
constant stimulation is not necessary, which has been one of the major hurdles to overcome 
with developing neuroprosthetics with a sense of ownership.  
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Moreover, accumulating evidence suggest that schizophrenic patients have impairments in 
predicting the sensory consequences of their actions. Hence, they rely more on the retrospective 
component of agency i.e., they are more likely to causally link two events to each other based 
on the physical relation between action and outcome, so-called altered perceived causality 
(Wende et al., 2015). Since the proposed mechanism for these impairments is the inadequate 
ability to generate sensory predictions of their own actions (S. J. Blakemore et al., 2000; Chris 
D Frith et al., 2000; Shergill et al., 2005), the results from the studies in this thesis, in particular 
Study IV which sheds light on the neural mechanisms of the sense of agency, might be relevant 
for future diagnostic and therapeutic tools for patients suffering from this debilitating illness. 
Unfortunately outside the scope of this thesis, future experiments should elucidate whether 
schizophrenics display the same neural activation pattern associated with the sense of body 
ownership and agency as well as their interaction.   
In conclusion, the studies in this thesis expand our knowledge of two fundamental processes 
of bodily awareness: the process of self-attribution of our limbs (body ownership) and the 
process of self-attribution of actions (agency). Together, the results from Studies I-IV provide 
evidence in favor of the sense of body ownership being dependent on multisensory mechanisms 
while the sense of agency is dependent on the prediction and comparison of reafferent sensory 
signals. Furthermore, the results from Study IV indicate that these two processes are 
perceptually and neurally distinct, with a possible integrative component with regards to the 
physical body. Increasing our understanding of these processes and their underlying neural 
mechanisms has implications for both the cognitive neuroscientific odyssey of understanding 
self-consciousness as well as for clinical research on patients with disturbances in these 
processes. 
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